188 plagiarism fragments in the thesis "Electoral Systems and Electoral Outcomes: A Comparative Study" by Roberta Tedesco Triccas (present surname: Metsola), University of Malta, 2003

(left column Roberta Tedesco Triccas; right column uncited original source)

survive. Electoral systems are one such democratic, political institution which influences these conditions. In other words, they play a large role in shaping the rules of the game under which democracy is practised in a country.
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Political institutions shape the rules of the game under which democracy is practised, and it is often argued that the easiest

Taken from Andrew Reynolds and Benjamin Reilly (eds.), The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (2nd ed., Stockholm 1997). The contents were also available online before the submission of the dissertation, see https://web.archive.org/web/20030111025637/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/es30.htm

As sociologists Mozaffar and Schedler emphasise, the electorate becomes part of the legitimating structure. They say that elections, "by being the largest peacetime mobilization in which a large proportion of the citizenry participate in selecting and removing political representatives…provide a primary source of democratic legitimacy"[3]. The electorate, rather than the government, holds the ultimate

[3] Mozaffar, Shaheen and Andrew Schedler. 2002. "The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance." As seen in *International Political Science Review*. Issue 23(1). Pages 5-24.

p. 9. The sentence in quotation marks which seems to be a quote from Mozaffar and Schedler is taken from Lindberg, 2005.

Lindberg's work was already published in 2002, as indicated in the bibliography of the dissertation (p. 127):

Lindberg, Staffan I. 2002. *Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary Inquiry*. Library of the Department of Political Science, University of Lund, Sweden. [Funded by Sida Grant No. SWE-1999-231]

defining the concept, no one seems to denounce them as an unimportant. Being the largest peacetime mobilization in which a large proportion of the citizenry participate in selecting and removing political representatives, it provides a primary source of democratic legitimacy (cf. Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). Di Palma's (1990) truism 'to

Staffan Lindberg, Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary Inquiry. In: Electoral Studies 24 (2005), pp. 41–64; p. 43

viable government. Every democracy has a different set of priorities. The main difference in the criteria for the design of an electoral system is the one between government effectiveness and proportionality[6]. In one country the emphasis may

[6] Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts (1995), "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform" in *International Political Science Review* 16: 9-29. See also Norris, Pippa (1997), "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems" in *International Political Science Review* 18 (3): 297-312.

p. 9. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

The main difference in the criteria for the design of an electoral system discussed in the literature is the one between governability or government effectiveness and proportionality (Dunleavy and Margretts 1995, Norris 1997). Democratic theory demands for political

Georg Lutz, Measuring electoral systems by comparing outcomes in the same area under different rules. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 1st General Conference, Canterbury, Section 11 (Political Institutions and institutional change) / Panel 6 (Electoral Reforms in Stable Democracies) (2001), p. 14

Therefore, despite the almost complete consensus among scholars that institutions like electoral systems matter because they structure incentives, preferences and outcomes, there are very few studies on the effects of one choice over another in the constitutional design in democratic states[8].

[8] Opinion expressed by Diamond 1999; Gunther et al 1995; Linz and Stephan 1996; O'Donnell 1996; Schedler 1998, 2001; Valenzuela 1992.

p. 10. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

Despite the almost complete consensus among scholars that institutions like electoral systems matter because they structure incentives, preferences and outcomes, there are very few studies on the effects of distinct choices in constitutional design in new democracies. 'Consolidologists' tend to agree that consolidation of democracy Diamond, 1999; Günther et al., 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 1998, 2001; Valenzuela, 1992). Yet, few seem to ask: Does it matter what

Lindberg, 2005, p. 43

Yet particular questions which are of indubitable importance are rarely asked such as: Does it matter what *type* of institutions are put in place? Are majoritarian, mixed or proportional electoral representations doing better or worse when one compares different systems? What are the effects of the constitutional design on party systems, governing capacity, political capacity, political competition and the quality of elections in new democracies?

p. 10

Schedler, 1998, 2001; Valenzuela, 1992). Yet, few seem to ask: Does it matter what *types* of institutions are put in place? Are majoritarian, mixed or proportional electoral representations doing better or worse? What are the effects of the constitutional design on party systems, governing capacity, political competition and the quality of elections in *new* democracies? These are the theoretical issues this article

Lindberg, 2005, p. 43

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consequences. By the very nature of the questions being addressed, the literature on electoral systems is necessarily comparative. Unfortunately, many studies in

p. 11

By the very nature of the questions being addressed, the literature on electoral systems is necessarily comparative. The effects of one system are

Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman, Introduction: STV as an Embedded Institution. In: Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman, (eds.), Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution. (Ann Arbor 2000), pp. 1-14; p. 5

general quantitative studies that were written, one can mention *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* first written by Douglas W. Rae in 1967 and then republished in 1971. This work has maintained a stellar reputation as the most important book in the field of comparative electoral systems ever since. It most

p. 11

hen the first edition of Douglas W. Rae's *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* was published in 1967, it was almost instantly recognized as a great scholarly breakthrough. A second edition was published in 1971, and it has maintained its stellar reputation as the most important book in the field of comparative electoral systems ever since.

Arend Lijphart, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85. In: The American Political Science Review, 84/2 (1990), pp. 481-496; p. 481

Consequences of Electoral Laws first written by Douglas W. Rae in 1967 and then republished in 1971. This work has maintained a stellar reputation as the most important book in the field of comparative electoral systems ever since. It most certainly set the trend on how to study electoral systems and their political consequences. However, some of his ideas have been superseded, while others have come under substantially harsh criticism by equally distinguished authors such as Arend Lijphart, Giovanni Sartori and Bernard Grofman. In this thesis I will primarily attempt to put his and others' ideas[9] within a comprehensive

[9] Such as Michael Gallagher, Richard Katz, Arend Lijphart, Matthew Shugart and Rein Taagepera.

p. 11

treatments of electoral systems. The seminal work by Douglas Rae (1967) set the trend on how to study electoral systems and their political consequences. It is only in the past five years or so that Rae's work has come under closer scrutiny as scholars, like Michael Gallagher, Richard Katz, Arend Lijphart, Matthew Shugart and Rein Taagepera, have sought to develop and improve on some of his ideas.

David Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems (Hemel Hempstead 1997), pp. 1-2

Electoral systems are a much disputed topic not only in the new democracies but even in more than a few of the established democracies. Also, a small but growing group of academic scholars are starting to express increasing interest in studying

p. 11

Electoral systems are currently much in vogue, in the new democracies, more than a few of the established democracies, and among the small but growing group of academic scholars specializing in this

Farrell, 1997, p. xiii

However, as David Farrell states, for people who do not specialise in this area, electoral systems are usually seen as a big turn off. Indeed, it can be difficult to engage much interest in the subject of counting rules and to show enthusiasm about the details of how one electoral system varies from another. As the UK

p. 11. Although Farrell is mentioned, it is not clear which of his works is meant, and a corresponding footnote is only to be found in the following paragraph on the next page, after a quote from another source and a footnote referring to that source.

For people who do not specialize in this area, electoral systems are usually seen as a big 'turn-off'. It can be difficult to instil much interest in the subject of counting rules; to enthuse about the details of how one electoral system varies from another. After all, how many

Farrell, 1997, p. 1

scholar in this field, "…one must recognise that electoral system reform is perceived as a key, or perhaps *the* key, to reforming the political system"[12].

[12] Nohlen, Dieter. 1996. "Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America." In Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman (eds) *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America.* Boulder C. O. Westview Press. Page 44.

p. 12. Same excerpt of quote as in Lindberg's work.

democratization since "…one must recognize that electoral system reform is perceived as a key, or perhaps the key, to reforming the political system'' (Nohlen, 1996, p. 44).

Lindberg, 2005, p. 43

In addition, electoral systems are even more worth examining today than they were two decades ago, because they have become politically appealing. With the democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of last century, important decisions had to be taken on which electoral systems to adopt in the weak, fledgling democracies. It is interesting to reflect on the reasoning behind these particular decisions taken in each new country. Of even greater interest is the recent trend towards reform of existing electoral systems, notably in Italy, Japan and New Zealand – all within the past decade. With these concrete and relatively

pp. 12-13

Second, electoral systems are worth examining because they have become politically interesting. With the process of democratization, first in Mediterranean Europe in the 1970s, and then more dramatically in central and eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, important decisions had to be taken on which electoral systems to adopt in the fledgling representative democracies. As we shall see in later chapters selected. It is interesting to speculate on the reasoning behind these particular decisions. Of even greater interest is the recent trend towards *reform* of existing electoral systems, notably in Italy, Japan and New Zealand – all within the past three to four years. This

Farrell, 1997, p. 2

Electoral rules or laws govern the process of elections, the purpose of which is to produce a legislature. They define the electoral formula, district magnitudes, district boundaries, assembly size, suffrage rights, rules of representation, electoral calendar, voter, party and candidate eligibility and registration, election observation, resource endowments of parties and candidates, methods of counting, tabulating and reporting of votes, election management bodies and dispute settlement authorities[13]. On the other hand, what is usually referred to as 'electoral systems' regards the rules concerning both the method of voting as well as the mechanism used in translation of votes into seats in the representative body[14], in

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[13] Mozaffar, Shaheen and Andrew Schedler. 2002. "The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance." As seen in *International Political Science Review*. Issue 23(1). Pages 5-24. Sartori, Giovanni. 1997. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. 2nd edit, New York: New York University Press.

[14] Sartori, Giovanni. 2001. "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems". In Larry Diamond and Richard Günther *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press. Page 99.

p. 13

Electoral rules define, among other things, the electoral formula, district magnitudes, district boundaries, assembly size, suffrage rights, rules of representation, electoral calendar, voter, party and candidate eligibility and registration, election observation, resource endowments of parties and candidates, methods of counting, tabulating and reporting of votes, election management bodies and dispute settlement authorities (cf. Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002; Sartori, 1997). What is usually referred to as 'electoral systems' regards the rules concerning both voting method and the method used in translation of votes into seats in the representative body (Sartori, 2001, p. 99).

Lindberg, 2005, p. 43

Farrell says, it is "...the system which comes to life once the campaign has ended"[15].

Electoral systems are designed to fulfil a number of other – often conflicting – functions, such as reflecting the wishes of voters, producing strong and stable governments and electing qualified representatives. Therefore, in selecting a particular design of electoral system, the 'electoral engineers' have to take important decisions about which function should be given most importance. As a result, no two countries have the same electoral system.

p. 14. Farrell is only cited in quotation marks at the end of the preceding paragraph.

and accepted legitimacy of the system, electoral systems are designed to fulfil a number of other – often conflicting – functions, such as reflecting the wishes of voters, producing strong and stable governments, electing qualified representatives, and so on. In selecting a particular design of electoral system, the 'electoral engineers' have to take important decisions about which function to stress most. As a result, no two countries have the same electoral system.

Farrell, 1997, p. 3

The electoral system's primary role is to preserve the political stability in the face of potentially disruptive or paralysing disagreements. As shall be seen in the third

p. 14

In sum, a main function of any electoral system is to preserve political stability in the face of potentially disruptive or paralyzing disagreements on issues. Figure 6.1 shows this situation graphically.

Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven 1989), p. 63

The study of electoral systems is primarily concerned with the institutional arrangements used to translate votes cast for political parties and/or candidates into seats in elections to a national legislature. Indeed, as stated by Lijphart,

p. 14

The study of electoral systems is concerned with the institutional arrangements used to translate votes cast for political parties and/or candidates into seats, as in elections to a national legislature. Because

Taagepera, Soberg Shugart, 1989, p. xi

An emphasis will be placed on electoral systems that have been used in the world's most successful and longest existing democracies. The electoral systems will be described in terms of their basic properties – the electoral formula, the district magnitude and the ballot structure. All these so-called 'mechanical' effects

p. 15

effects on party systems. My emphasis will be on the electoral systems that have been used in the world's most successful democracies—that is, those that have been in existence for a long time—most of which are European democracies. I shall describe the electoral systems in terms of their three most basic properties: the electoral formula (such as plurality, the different forms of proportional representation, and so on), the district magnitude (the number of representatives elected per district), and the electoral threshold (the minimum support that a party needs to obtain in

Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990 (Comparative European Politics, New York 1994), p. 1

cohesion and discipline, is heavily influenced by it. Electoral systems can also influence the way parties campaign and the way political elites behave, thus helping to determine the broader political climate.

p. 16

one voice and suppress dissent. Electoral systems can also influence the way parties campaign and the way political elites behave, thus helping to determine the broader political climate; they may

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20030111025637/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/es30.htm

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part of the broader political system. One of the aims of this thesis is to arrive at an understanding of electoral institutions as being embedded within a particular context. Besides being themselves political institutions, electoral systems are also used to understand the effects of institutions as being mediated by the political and social context in which they are entrenched[20].

[20] Farrell, David. 1997. *Comparing Electoral Systems*. London: Prentice Hall.

p. 16. Adoption of literature reference.

point of this exercise is to arrive at an understanding of electoral institutions, and perhaps institutions more generally, as being embedded within a particular context.

ested in the study of STV per se; rather, we use STV, and electoral rules more generally, as a lens through which to understand the effects of institutions as being mediated by the political and social context in which they are embedded (Farrell 1997).

Bowler, Grofman, 2000 (Introduction), pp. 7, 1

The first part gives a general description of various electoral systems and their components. It is very descriptive and falls short of being analytical. The second part, embodied in the third and fourth chapter, concentrates on empirical analyses of electoral systems. Several variables are defined, examined and interrelated in

p. 17

The first part of this book gives a general description of various electoral systems and their components. Interaction among the vari- overview of the study of electoral systems is also given. This first part is largely descriptive and qualitative rather than analytical, and most of it could have been written twenty years ago.

The second part concentrates on empirical analysis of electoral systems and forms the core of the book. Nearly all of this work was

Taagepera, Soberg Shugart, 1989, p. 6

Given space limitations, this thesis does not tackle all possible aspects of electoral systems. I have however made the effort to focus on the arguments presented

p. 18

Given space limitations, our book does not cover all possible aspects of electoral systems. The introduction to Grofman and Lijphart

Taagepera, Soberg Shugart, 1989, p. xiv

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the number of systems that democratic engineers and reformers have proposed is much smaller, and the number of those which have been in actual use is smaller still.

p. 19

The number of electoral systems is, in principle, infinite; the number of systems that democratic engineers and reformers have proposed is much smaller; and the number that have been in actual use is smaller still. I shall try to show that there is neither as

Lijphart, 1994, p. 1

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view of their eventual electoral outcome. The principal properties of each system will be presented in clearly defined categories so as to facilitate comparisons among them as well as the systematic testing of their political consequences in

p. 19

present the principal properties of the various electoral systems in clearly defined categories so as to facilitate comparisons among them as well as the systematic testing of their political consequences.[1]

Lijphart, 1994, p. 2

It must be noted that the electoral systems which will be analysed here are generally those used for national lower house elections, or in the case of unicameral parliaments, the elections of the one chamber.

p. 19

The electoral systems to be analysed are those for national lower-house elections (or, in the case of unicameral parliaments, the elections of the one chamber) in the countries and the period indicated.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 3

The essence of the majoritarian vision is governing capacity, or the creation of stable legislative majorities. Ideally, it leads to a *de facto* bi-party system with intense competition but clear legislative majorities, hence, high governing capacity and one-party executives. Electoral competition will thus focus on the median voter with a tendency to exclude extremist political supporters and peripheral voting populations[24]. In this regard, all majoritarian systems make it difficult for

[24] See Kent R. Weaver. 2002. "Electoral Rules and Governability." *Journal of Democracy*, Issue 13 Page 112.

p. 20. One out of several literature references in Lindberg's work has been copied, without mentioning the original source.

Regardless, the imperative of the majoritarian vision is governing capacity, or in other words, the creation of stable legislative majorities. The translation of votes-to-seats is parties competing for legislative seats and the number of parties in parliament. Ideally, it leads to a *de facto* biparty system with intense competition but clear legislative majorities, hence high governing capacity and one party executives. Electoral competition will typically focus on the median voter with a tendency to exclude extremist political supporters and peripheral voting populations. (Lijphart, 1984, extremist political supporters and peripheral voting populations. (Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Reynolds and Sisk, 1998, p. 23; Powell, 2000, pp. 22–23; Weaver, 2002, p. 112)

Lindberg, 2005, p. 44

or pluralities of the vote in electoral districts. Thus, the translation of votes-to-seats is typically highly disproportional through the winner-takes-all in single-member constituencies, which enhances, according to Lindberg, "clientilistic voting behaviour" due to the close personal relationship in such districts[25]. In such

[25] Lindberg, Staffan I. 2002. *Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary Inquiry.* Library of the Department of Political Science, University of Lund, Sweden. [Funded by Sida Grant No. SWE-1999-231] Page 7.

p. 21. Lindberg is cited in a way that suggests only the second part of the sentence, including the quote (adjusted to British English but indicated as original quote) has been copied.

words, the creation of stable legislative majorities. The translation of votes-to-seats is typically highly disproportional through the winner-takes-all in single-member constituencies. It is designated to have a strong reductive effect on the number of

raise the stakes in the game by it's winner-takes-all nature, and further clientistic voting behavior through the close personal relationship between voter and

Lindberg, 2005, p. 44

practices are stronger than in proportional systems[26]. For this reason, as shall be seen in the next two chapters, they tend to systematically favour large parties, produce disproportional electoral outcomes, and to discourage multipartism[27].

p. 21. The footnote does not refer to any source. The reference to Lijphart, 1994 is made only in footnote no. 28 in the following sentence.

electoral districts. For this reason, all majoritarian systems tend to systematically favour the larger parties, to produce disproportional election outcomes, and to discourage multipartism.[19] District mag-

Lijphart, 1994, p. 20

It is a system which is defended primarily on the grounds of simplicity and it being easy to understand, and its tendency to produce representatives from somewhat defined geographic areas. It is further argued that FPTP provides a clear-cut choice for voters between two main parties and gives rise to single-party governments while consequently providing for a coherent parliamentary opposition[33].

p. 22. The footnote does not refer to Reynolds, Reilly, 1997. Another of Reynold's works is only cited in the middle of the next paragraph.

First Past the Post (FPTP), like other plurality-majority electoral systems, is defended primarily on the grounds of simplicity and its tendency to produce representatives beholden to defined geographic areas. The most often cited

- It provides a clear cut choice for voters between two main parties. The built-in

- It gives rise to single party governments.

- It gives rise to a coherent parliamentary opposition. In theory, the flip side of a

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20021116162501/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd01a.htm

Conversely, it can also be advantageous in the sense that it allows voters to choose between people, rather than just between parties. At the same time, voters can assess the performance of individual candidates, rather than just having to accept a list of candidates presented by a party, as can happen under some list-PR electoral systems, analysed below.

Another advantage of FPTP is that it excludes extremist parties from parliamentary representation. Thus unless an extremist minority party's electoral support is geographically concentrated in individual constituencies[35]. Furthermore,

pp. 22-23. The copying continues after the footnote referring to Reynolds. Footnote no. 35 does not refer to any source.

- It allows voters to choose between people, rather than just between parties. At the same time, voters can assess the performance of individual candidates, rather than just having to accept a list of candidates presented by a party, as can happen under some List PR electoral systems.

- It excludes extremist parties from parliamentary representation. Unless an extremist minority party's electoral support is geographically concentrated, it is unlikely

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20021116162501/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd01a.htm

many argue that the strongest benefit of FPTP is the link between constituencies and their members of parliament. The legislative is one of geographical representatives: MPs represent defined areas of cities, towns or regions rather than just party labels. Many proponents of FPTP argue that true representative accountability depends upon the voters of one area knowing who their own representative is[36].

p. 23. The footnote does not refer to Reynolds.

• It retains the link between constituents and their Member of Parliament (MP). Perhaps the most often quoted advantage of FPTP systems is that they give rise to a parliament of geographical representatives: MPs represent defined areas of cities, towns, or regions rather than just party labels. Many proponents of FPTP argue that true representative accountability depends upon the voters of one area knowing who their own representative is, and having the ability

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20021116162501/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd01a.htm

India and New Zealand, before the latter switched to PR[37], made special provisions to create the possibility of representation of communal ethnic minorities. The New Zealand legislature reserved four seats for its Maori minority while in India, a little over a fifth of the seats are reserved for what are known as 'scheduled castes' and 'scheduled tribes'. Lijphart and Grofman also provide their readers with other examples where minority rights for representation are secured in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon and Zimbabwe[38]. This fact however, should not be

[38] Lijphart, Arend. "Proportionality by Non-PR Methods, Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe", in Grofman and Lijphart (eds.). 1986. *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, Pages 113-123.

p. 23. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source. Footnote no. 37 does not refer to Lijphart, 1994.

19. Two plurality countries have made special provisions for communal-ethnic minority representation by having reserved seats for these groups. New Zealand has four seats of this kind for its Maori minority. In India, more than a fifth of the seats have been set aside for the 'scheduled castes' and 'scheduled tribes'; in the first two elections, these seats were mainly in two-member districts with one reserved and one unreserved seat. For other examples of securing minority representation without PR, see Arend Lijphart, 'Proportionality by Non-PR Methods: Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe', in Grofman and Lijphart (eds.), *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, 113–23.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 181

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governmental process. Furthermore, any system with single-member districts is susceptible to boundary manipulation[41].

p. 24. The footnote does not refer to any source.

Any system with single-member districts is susceptible to boundary manipulation, such as

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see https://web.archive.org/web/20021116162614/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd01b.htm

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The French Fifth Republic provides the only instance of the so-called second ballot or two-ballot majority-plurality formula. In this system, an absolute majority, that is, more than half of the valid votes, is required for election on the first ballot. If the first ballot does not produce a winner, a second ballot is conducted where candidates with a minimum of 15.5 % of 'registered voters', as opposed to votes cast, proceed to the next round, and the candidate with most votes wins, even if he or she wins only a plurality of the votes. Usually the second ballot in France is a contest between two principal candidates, because the weakest candidates are forced to withdraw and other candidates may withdraw voluntarily in favour of stronger candidates of stronger, allied parties.
One must note that there is a distinction between the French legislative and presidential elections. The former uses majority-plurality formula and the latter is called a majority-runoff in which the second round of the election is restricted to the top two candidates from the first round. This, according to Lijphart[42] may thus

pp. 24-25. A reference to Lijphart, 1994 is only made after a long passage of text, and the wording ("This, according to Lijphart") indicates that only the following, but not the preceding contents are taken from this source.

The French Fifth Republic provides the only instance of the two-ballot majority-plurality formula. Here the rule is that a majority (that is, an absolute majority—more than half of the valid votes) is required for election on the first ballot; if the first ballot does not produce a winner, a second ballot is conducted and the candidate with the most votes wins, even if he or she wins only a plurality of the votes. The second ballot can have more than two candidates, but the usual second-ballot pattern in France is a contest between two principal candidates, because the weakest candidates are forced to withdraw and other candidates may withdraw voluntarily in favour of stronger candidates of allied parties. However, the majority-plurality formula should be distinguished from the majority-runoff in which the second round of the election is restricted to the top two candidates from the first round; it may

Lijphart, 1994, p. 18

The alternative vote is a relatively unusual electoral system. Australia is the only country where it has been used. It is also used, in a modified form, in Nauru[43].

[43] AV was also used for general elections in Papua New Guinea between 1964 and 1975 and in 1996 it was recommended as the new electoral system in Fiji.

p. 25

The Alternative Vote (AV) is a relatively unusual electoral system, today used only in Australia, and, in a modified form, in Nauru. Recently, the system has been muted as the best alternative to FPTP in the United Kingdom. AV was used for general elections in Papua New Guinea between 1964 and 1975 (see Papua New Guinea), and in 1996 was recommended as the new electoral system for Fiji. It is thus

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see

https://web.archive.org/web/20021217214008/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd03.htm

it is also a preferential system in that voters are asked to list the candidates in order of their preference[44]. AV also differs from FPTP in the way the votes are counted.

[44] In fact, in Australia, the term 'preferential voting' is usually used. This may be thought of as a refinement of the majority-runoff formula in that weak candidates are eliminated one at a time, rather than only the top two candidates remaining in the race, and that the voters only go once to the polls. Wright, an expert on Australian elections, uses the 'majority-preferential' method and the 'quota-preferential' method to distinguish between the so-called 'preferential' alternative vote and other preferential formulae such as STV, respectively. [Jack F. H. Wright, 'Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems', in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) 1986. *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*. New York: Agathon Press. Pages 124-38]

p. 25. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

Voters are asked to list the candidates in order of their preference. and *C*—one of whom will be the winner. The alternative vote, which in Australia is usually referred to as 'preferential voting', may be thought of as a refinement of the majority-runoff formula in the sense that weak candidates are eliminated one at a time (instead of all but the top two candidates at the same time) and that voters do not have to go to the polls twice.[17]

17. In order to distinguish the 'preferential' alternative vote from the other preferential formula—the single transferable vote, which is a PR formula that I shall discuss later in this chapter—the Australian electoral system expert Jack F. H. Wright uses the more precise terms 'majority-preferential' method and 'quota-preferential' method respectively: 'Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems', in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 124–38.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 19, 181

of their preference[44]. AV also differs from FPTP in the way the votes are counted.

p. 25

AV also differs from FPTP in the way votes are counted. Like

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20021217214008/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd03.htm

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Any candidate who receives an absolute majority of first preferences is elected, if not, the weakest candidate is eliminated, and that person's ballots are redistributed among the remaining candidates according to the second preferences manifested

p. 25

If a candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, he or she is elected; if not, the weakest candidate is eliminated, and his or her ballots are redistributed among the remaining candidates according to these ballots' second preferences; this process

Lijphart, 1994, p. 19

on them. These are then assigned to the remaining candidates in the order as marked on the ballot. This process is continued until a winner emerges by majority. For this reason, AV is usually classified as a majoritarian system, as a candidate requires an absolute majority, and not just a plurality, of all the votes cast, to secure a seat.

p. 25

These are then assigned to the remaining candidates in the order as marked on the ballot. This process is repeated until one candidate has an absolute majority, and is declared duly elected. For this reason, AV is usually classified as a majoritarian system, as a candidate requires an absolute majority, and not just a plurality, of all votes cast to secure a seat.

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20021217214008/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esd03.htm

number of forms. The purpose of the introduction of PR in many countries was to achieve greater proportionality and better minority representation than the earlier majoritarian electoral methods had produced until then.

Systems of proportional representation are often thought to be inherently complicated, "newspaper articles reporting on PR elections automatically call the PR system being used a 'complex form of PR'"[49]. Lijphart disagrees and says that

p. 27. Lijphart, 1994 is only cited in the next paragraph, with divergent page references.

and the limited vote). The purpose of the introduction of PR in many countries was to achieve greater proportionality and better minority representation than the earlier majoritarian electoral methods had produced.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 10

complicated situation of having two or more levels of districts. In his analyses of twenty-one PR systems which have these so-called two tiers of districts, Lijphart gives the example of a country with PR, where elections may be divided into for instance twenty-five electoral districts, but may also have a national district that is super-imposed on the lower-level districts. Rae termed this as 'complex districting'[59].

[59] Rae, Douglas W. 1971. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. 2nd Ed., New Haven Conncticut: Yalc University Press. Pages 21 and 124.

p. 31. Although Lijphart is mentioned in the text, a corresponding footnote is missing. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

two, or even more, levels of districts; for instance, a country with PR elections may be divided into, say, ten or twenty electoral districts, but may also have a national district that is superimposed on the lower-level districts. This type of system, for which Rae has coined the term 'complex districting',[5] will be explained in due

5. Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (2nd edn., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 21, 124.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 11

[61] Germany has taken this to the extreme point of adopting single-member districts at the lower level. The major exceptions to this are Italy and Austria; the latter since 1971.

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than 10 seats; Italy and, since 1971, Austria are the major exceptions. Germany has taken the idea of small lower-tier districts, providing close voter–representative contact, to its logical extreme by adopting single-member districts at the lower level. The other side

Lijphart, 1994, p. 36

in his calculation of the various types of quotas, Lijphart illustrates three different quotas used by remainder-transfer systems. When such quotas are used, in the first round of the election, parties with votes over the quota are allocated seats.

The oldest and best known of such systems simply used as its quota the total number of valid votes cast in a district divided by the number of seats or the district magnitude. This quota is usually referred to as the Hare quota, named after the English barrister Thomas Hare, and is impartial as between small and large parties[65]. Thus it tends to yield closely proportional results. Significantly less proportional outcomes are produced by the Droop and Imperiali quotas. The former, which is named after mathematician, H K Droop, divides the votes by $m + 1$ instead of m[66]. This quota is often referred to as the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota in Continental Europe, after Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff. There is a slight difference between the two. If v stands for the total number of district votes and m for the district magnitude, the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota is $v/(m + 1)$, usually rounded up, whereas the Droop quota is defined as $v/(m + 1) + 1$, rounded down if necessary[67]. The third type is called the Imperiali quota and its effects are also said

[67] Leonard, Dick, and Richard Natkiel. 1987. *World Atlas of Elections: Voting Patterns in 39 Democracies*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

pp. 32-33. The footnotes do not refer to Lijphart, 1990. Although Lijphart is mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, a corresponding footnote is missing. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

remainders (LR) systems. The oldest and best known of these simply uses as its quota the total number of valid votes cast in a district divided by the district magnitude (m, the total number of seats available in the district). This quota, usually referred to as the Hare quota, is impartial as between small and large parties and tends to yield closely proportional results. Less proportional outcomes are produced by the Droop quota, which divides the votes by $m + 1$ instead of m, and the Im-

5. In Continental Europe, the Droop quota is often called the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota. Strictly speaking, there is a slight difference between the two. If v stands for the total number of district votes and m for the district magnitude, the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota is $v/(m + 1)$, usually rounded up, whereas the Droop quota is defined as $v/(m + 1) + 1$, rounded down if necessary (Leonard and Natkiel 1987, 3). Therefore, the two quotas differ if $v/(m + 1)$

Lijphart, 1990, pp. 484, 494

mathematical justification". Lijphart's findings show that the Imperiali quotas are so low that there will be very few, if any, remaining seats, as all the seats can be assigned without the use of remaining votes. Humphreys in fact concludes that the electoral outcome would thus be identical to that of the d'Hondt formula[69].

[69] Humphreys, John H. 1911. *Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election.* London: Methuen. Pages 188-9.

p. 33. Although Lijphart is mentioned at the beginning of the depicted passage of text, a corresponding footnote is missing. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

portionality. The Imperiali quotas are so low that there will often not be any remaining seats. Whenever the quota is lowered to such an extent that all seats can be assigned without the use of remaining votes, the outcome becomes exactly the same as that of the d'Hondt formula.[22]

22. G. Van den Bergh, *Unity in Diversity: A Systematic Critical Analysis of All Electoral Systems* (London: Batsford, 1955), 68–72. This important property of the d'Hondt formula was also already emphasized by John H. Humphreys, *Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election* (London: Methuen, 1911), 188–9.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 23, 181

The use of these lower quotas means that there will be fewer remaining seats to be allocated and hence also more wastage of remaining votes, which is especially harmful to the smaller political parties and results in a decrease in proportionality. Van den Bergh shows how when the quota is lowered even further, to the extent that there will not be any remaining seats, the outcome becomes exactly the same as that of the d'Hondt formula[70].

[70] Van den Bergh, G. 1955. *Unity in Diversity: A Systematic Critical Analysis of All Electoral Systems*. London: Batsford. Pages 68-72.

p. 34. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

denominator.[5] The use of these lower quotas means that there will be fewer remaining seats to be allocated and hence also more wastage of remaining votes, which is especially harmful to the smaller parties and results in a decrease in proportionality. It can be shown that when the quota is lowered even further, to the extent that there will not be any remaining seats, the outcome becomes exactly the same as that of the d'Hondt formula (Van den Bergh 1955, 68–72). In preferential

Lijphart, 1990, p. 484

STV is a member of the relatively less well understood family of ordinal electoral systems which falls under the category of preferential voting mechanism carried out in constituencies returning more than one member. It is credited with presenting both voters and parties with a wide range of strategic options and possibilities – a range that is far wider than that presented either by majoritarian or list PR systems. It was originally known as the 'Hare System' having taken its

p. 35

STV is a member of the relatively less well understood family of ordinal electoral systems. These systems present both voters and parties with a wide range of strategic options and possibilities—a range that is far wider than that presented by either the single-member simple-plurality system or list PR, the

Bowler, Grofman, 2000 (Introduction), p. 6

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list PR systems. It was originally known as the 'Hare System' having taken its name after Thomas Hare who is credited most, together with the Dane Carl Andrae with devising it in the 1850s[74]. In fact it is sometimes called the 'Hare-

[74] Bogdanor, Vernon. 1989. "Direct Elections, Representative Democracy and European Integration", *Electoral Studies*, Issue 8, Page 208. See also Vernon Bogdanor. 1984. *What is Proportional Representation? A guide to the Issues.* Oxford: Martin Robinson; David Butler. 1963. *The Electoral System in Britain since 1918.* 2d ed, Oxford, Clarendon Press; J. Hart. 1992. *Proportional Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System 1820-1945*, 1992, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

p. 35. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

STV, has varied in the countries where it is used. STV was originally known as the "Hare system," after the English barrister, Thomas Hare (1806–91), who is credited most (together with the Dane, Carl Andrae) with devising it in the 1850s (Bogdanor 1981; Butler 1963; Hart 1992). In Ireland and the

David Farrell and Ian McAllister, Through a Glass Darkly: Understanding the World of STV. In: Bowler, Grofman, 2000, pp. 17-36; p. 19

STV is used in varies greatly with regard to district size, ballot paper design, effective threshold, assembly size and the methods that are used to fill casual vacancies, as shall be seen below in a comparison between the system in Malta and Ireland. The name given to this system has varied in the countries where it is used.

pp. 35-36

number of countries. There is no single form of STV; rather, the systems that are (and have been) used differ widely on five major characteristics, ranging from district size to ballot paper design and the methods that are used to fill casual vacancies. Perhaps most importantly, there are considerable variations

The name given to this electoral system, which we are referring to as STV, has varied in the countries where it is used. STV was originally known

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, pp. 33, 19

Firstly a quota has to be calculated. In preferential PR, the quota is as important for the proportionality of the electoral outcome as in list-PR largest-remainder systems. The Droop quota explained above is used. The first stage of the count is

p. 36

den Bergh 1955, 68–72). In preferential PR, usually referred to as single transferable vote (STV) systems, the quota is as important for the proportionality of the electoral outcome as in list-PR largest-remainders systems. The one case of STV

Lijphart, 1990, p. 484

systems. The Droop quota explained above is used. The first stage of the count is to ascertain the total number of first-preference votes for each candidate. Any candidate who receives more first preferences than the quota is immediately elected. If no candidate has achieved this quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated, with his second preferences being redistributed to the candidates left in the race. At the same time, the surplus votes of elected candidates are redistributed in accordance with the second preferences on the ballot sheets. All the candidate's ballots are redistributed, however, each ballot is given a fractional percentage of one vote. Thus, the total redistributed vote is equal to the elected candidate's surplus.

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The first stage of the count is to ascertain the total number of first-preference votes for each candidate. Any candidate who has more first preferences than the quota is immediately elected. If no-one has achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated, with his or her second preferences being redistributed to the candidates left in the race. At the same time, the surplus votes of elected candidates (i.e., those votes above the quota) are redistributed according to the second preferences on the ballot papers. For fairness, all the candidate's ballot papers are redistributed, but each at a fractional percentage of one vote, so that the total redistributed vote equals the candidate's surplus (except in

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20030101055504/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esf04.htm

STV is an important electoral system for both practical and theoretical reasons. Primarily, it permits voters greater choice and it allows for the possibility of party based voting without limiting the voter's choices to the candidates of a single party in the way that pure list proportional systems do. Moreover, the first

pp. 36-37

The single transferable vote system (STV) is an important electoral system for both practical and theoretical reasons. In allowing voters to identify a rank ordering of their preferences and not just to mark an X, STV permits voters greater choice and makes possible ballot splitting to express highly differentiated preferences. In particular, it allows for the possibility of party-based voting without limiting the voter's choices to the candidates of a single party in the way that pure list proportional representation (PR) systems do.

Bowler, Grofman, 2000 (Introduction), p. 1

party in the way that pure list proportional systems do. Moreover, the first preference votes serve a dual purpose, namely to select a government in addition to allowing a voter to express a preference for the best liked candidate. The first choice is a vote to affect the complexion of government, both the legislative and executive branches.

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the first-preference vote serves a dual purpose, namely, to select a government in addition to allowing the voter to express a preference for the best-liked candidate. The first choice is a vote to affect the complexion of government, both the legislative and the executive branches. The voters know that their verdict

Wolfgang Hirczy de Miño and John Lane, Malta: STV in a Two-Party System In: Bowler, Grofman, 2000, pp. 178–204; p. 191

a class of its own"[75]. Another acclaimed academic in the field, Richard Sinnott, observes that, STV "involves a notion of the connection between the individual representative and his or her constituency that is much closer to the notion of representation implicit in the first past the post system than to the notion of the representation of parties underlying list systems"[76].

[76] Sinnott, Richard. 1993. "The Electoral System." In *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, edited by John Coakley and Michael Gallagher. 2nd ed, Dublin: Folens and PSAI. Page 68.

p. 37. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

PR. As Sinnott[11] observes, STV 'involves a notion of the connection between the individual representative and his or her constituency that is much closer to the notion of representation implicit in the first past the post system than to the notion of the representation of parties underlying list systems'. In practice that

[11] R. Sinnott, 'The electoral system' in J. Coakley and M. Gallagher (eds), *Politics in the Republic of Ireland* (Dublin, Folens/PSAI, 2nd ed., 1993), p. 68.

David Farrell, Malcom Mackerras and Ian McAllister, Designing Electoral Institutions: STV Systems and their Consequences. In: Political Studies 44/1 (1996), pp. 24-43; p. 26

Almost two decades ago, Lijphart and Grofman made the following statement: "...In general strong PR advocates tend to be strongly in favour of the STV form of PR. It is ironic that list PR, which is the most common electoral system in Western democracies, does not have any enthusiastic champions. STV may be the theoretically optimal form of PR in the opinion of the academics, but, in practice, list PR is more attractive to established political parties and hence much more widely used..."[77]

[77] Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman.1984. "Choosing an Electoral System." In *Choosing and Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman. New York: The Free Press. Page 6.

pp. 37-38. Adoption of literature reference. The original source is only cited in the next footnote.

In general, strong PR advocates tend to be strongly in favor of the STV form of PR. It is ironic that list PR, which is the most common electoral system in Western democracies, does not have any enthusiastic champions. STV may be the theoretically optimal form of PR in the opinion of the academics, but, in practice, list PR is more attractive to established political parties and hence much more widely used

Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman[1]

[1] A. Lijphart and B. Grofman, 'Choosing an electoral system' in A. Lijphart and B. Grofman (eds), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives* (New York, Praeger, 1984), p. 6.

Farrell, Mackerras, McAllister, 1996, p. 24

statement. With the singular and brief, exception of Estonia, none of the electoral reforms has involved the adoption of STV[79]. Lijphart and Grofman were truly proven right. But why is this?

[79] Estonia then switched to List PR in 1992. See Rein. Taagepera. 1990. "The Baltic States." *Electoral Studies* 9. Pages 303-311. See also Paul Wilder. 1993. "The Estonian Elections of 1992: Proportionality and Party Organisation in a New Democracy." *Representation*. Issue 31. Page 72.

p. 38. The copying continues after footnote no. 78 which refers to Farrell, Mackerras, McAllister, 1996.

electoral reform. With the singular (and only temporary) exception of the small state of Estonia,[3] none of the electoral reforms has involved the adoption of the single transferable vote (STV). In short, the past decade has borne out Lijphart and Grofman's observation.

the choice is list PR'. Estonia's decision to adopt STV in 1989 endangered this law, though only temporarily as the Baltic state switched to list PR in 1992.[9]

[3] R. Taagepera, 'The Baltic States', *Electoral Studies*, 9 (1990), 303–11; P. Wilder, 'The Estonian elections of 1992: proportionality and party organization in a new democracy', *Representation: Journal of Electoral Record and Comment*, 31 (1993), 72–6.

Farrell, Mackerras, McAllister, 1996, pp. 25-26, 25

Malta's experience with elections to representative institutions predates its independence by more than a century[82]. The first vote by secret ballot, for a council of government, took place as early as 1849, and STV has been in continual use since 1921[83]. The Malta Independence Commission of 1964 established the country as a liberal parliamentary democracy. It provides for protection of fundamental human rights; separation of powers among executive, legislative and judicial branches; and regular elections based on universal suffrage. Not counting

p. 39. The footnotes do not refer to Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000.

The country's experience with elections to representative institutions, however, predates its independence by more than a century. The first vote by secret ballot, for a council of government, took place as early as 1849, and STV has been in continual use since 1921. However, various representative institu-

The Malta Independence Constitution of 1964 established the country as a liberal parliamentary democracy. It provides for protection of fundamental human rights; separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches; and regular elections based on universal suffrage. Given its small

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 178

more than fifteen"[86]. At present, the figure is fixed at thirteen districts returning five members each. The electoral formula is constitutionally entrenched and has been used in all 20 elections conducted since 1921. Thus, Article 56 of the Constitution lays down that the members are "elected upon the principle of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote".

IV. II. 1   HOW WELL HAS STV WORKED FOR THE MALTESE SYSTEM?

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members. From 13 districts of five members each, the members are "elected upon the principle of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote" (Malta Independence Constitution, art. 56). This electoral formula is constitutionally entrenched and has been used in all 20 elections conducted since 1921. The maximum length of a parliamentary term is five years.

How well has STV worked for the Maltese? An unqualified answer one

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, pp. 178, 202

system always give. Nevertheless, STV in Malta has proven to be couched in very unique circumstances due to the strong two-party situation that exists. This, according to Bowler and Grofman, is the most striking contrast with STV in Ireland. Also worth noting is the absence of any coalition dynamics that are present in the process between the voters who express their respective preferences at the polls and the eventual formation of the government.

STV, as a system, can be said to have failed when the mechanics of the system resulted in the losing party gaining control of the government. In 1981, the PN

pp. 39-40. Instead of Hirczy de Miño and Lane, the authors of the compilation, (Bowler and Grofman) are mentioned, without any footnote. In the original, the "most striking contrast with Ireland (...) is the absence of any coalition dynamics". This has been changed to the "unique circumstances due to the strong two-party situation" in the dissertation.

The most striking contrast with Ireland (beyond the centrality of partisan-ship in elections) is the absence of any coalition dynamics that intervene between the expressed preferences of the voters and government formation. In way or another is not possible. STV can be said to have failed when the mechanics of the system resulted in the losing party (in first-preference votes in the nation as a whole) gaining control of the government. Although such per-

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, pp. 203, 202

resulted in the losing party gaining control of the government. In 1981, the PN won an overall majority of votes (50.9 percent) yet the MLP won an overall majority of seats (34 out of 65)[87]. This was due to the way the constituency boundaries had been drawn by the MLP government, an arrangement the PN alleged had been a gerrymander[88]. The PN boycotted parliament in consequence. Before the 1987 general elections, a new legislative provision was introduced[89], according to which, if a party won a majority of first preference votes but only a minority of lower-tier seats, it would receive a sufficient number of upper-level adjustment seats so as to give it an overall parliamentary majority. The newly

p. 40. The footnotes do not refer to Gallagher, 2000.

a result of the outcome of the 1981 election, when the PN won an overall majority of votes (50.9 percent) yet the MLP won a majority of the seats (34 out of 65). This was due to the way the constituency boundaries had been drawn by the MLP government, an arrangement the PN alleged had been a gerrymander. The PN boycotted Parliament in consequence. A new rule was then introduced, according to which if a party won a majority of votes but only a minority of seats, it would receive additional seats so as to give it an overall majority. This provision had to be invoked at the next election, in 1987, when

Michael Gallagher, The (Relatively) Victorious Incumbent under PR-STV: Legislative Turnover in Ireland and Malta. In: Bowler, Grofman, 2000, pp. 81-113; p. 88

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[88] It is interesting to note that Taagepera and Shugart and Gallagher allege district magnitude rather than gerrymandering to be the significant factor in the electoral outcome. See Rein Taagepera, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: the Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.* New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 237n; and, Gallagher, Michael. 1996. "By-Elections to Dáil Éireann: The Anomaly That Conforms." *Irish Political Studies* 11:33-60, Page 33.

p. 40

Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 237n) and Gallagher (1996, 3) point to low district magnitude rather than gerrymandering as a significant factor in the outcome. In any case, the constitutional amendments providing for adjustment by

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 199

This provision had to be invoked at the next election, in 1987, when the PN won 50.9 % of the votes but again lost 34 to 31 seats to MLP. Accordingly, the four non-elected candidates who had fared best, were awarded seats to give it a 35-34 majority, to reflect the narrow national vote majority and the size of Parliament grew to 69. The same provision was activated in 1996, when the MLP won a majority of votes but a minority of seats. Douglas Rae[91] has termed this a

p. 41

majority. This provision had to be invoked at the next election, in 1987, when the PN again won 50.9 percent of the votes but again lost 34 to 31 in seats to the MLP. Accordingly, its four "best losers" were awarded seats to give it a 35 – 34 majority, and the size of Parliament grew to 69. The same provision was activated in 1996, when the MLP won a majority of the votes but a minority of the seats.

Gallagher, 2000, p. 88

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majority of votes but a minority of seats. Douglas Rae[91] has termed this a "manufactured majority", that is, a party winning a majority of seats and forming a government without having a mandate of a majority of first count votes. Thus, in

[91] Rae, Douglas. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 74.

p. 41

There were several earlier instances (as in 1953 and 1966) of what Douglas Rae (1967, 74) has termed a "manufactured majority," that is, a party winning a majority of the seats and forming a government without having the mandate of a majority of first-count votes. Each of those cases had benefited

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 197

Grofman and Shaw express some hesitance over the provision laid down in Article 52 of the Constitution. In fact, they perceived it as a mere stopgap measure. This they argue on the basis that the amendments did not provide any assurance on the continuously debated issue of greater proportionality between the vote and seat percentages of the parties. Nevertheless they admit that, "the manner in which the problem was fixed is a good illustration of how perceived or real shortcomings of a particular set of electoral arrangements can be remedied through creative adaptations"[93].

[93] Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. *Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, Page 199.

pp. 41-42. The quote is wrongly attributed to the authors of the compilation, Bowler and Grofman.

tives instead of five. Moreover, the new rules did not provide any assurance on the continuously debated issue of greater proportionality between the vote and seat percentages of the parties. And thus the issue of electoral reform

the last two cases. The manner in which the problem was solved is a good illustration of how perceived or real shortcomings of a particular set of electoral arrangements can be remedied through creative adaptations.

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, pp. 201, 199

commonly viewed as a modified, special case of the former. As in plurality systems, the candidate who receives the most votes wins. However, in contrast to plurality systems, voters have less votes than there are seats in the district, hence the reason for it being termed 'limited'. The similarity to PR increases the more limited the number of votes accorded to the voter and the larger the number of seats eligible for election. On the other hand, with SNTV, the voter has just one

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their votes for individual candidates and, as in plurality systems, the candidates with the most votes win. However, unlike in plurality systems, the voters do not have as many votes as there are seats in the district (and districts have to have at least two seats): this is the reason why the formula is called the 'limited' vote. The more limited the number of votes each voter has, and the larger the number of seats at stake, the more LV tends to deviate from plurality and the more it resembles PR. In the 1946 LV election

Lijphart, 1994, p. 40

Giovanni Sartori[101] labels mixed member or hybrid systems as systems where both the voting method and the allocation of seats are in part majoritarian and in part proportional[102]. Such systems are known by a variety of different names, such as,

[101] Sartori, Giovanni. 2001. "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems." In Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press. Page 99.

p. 45. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

transferable vote (STV) as mixed electoral systems. I generally prefer Sartori's (2001, p. 99) proposal to use to the label exclusively for electoral systems where both the voting method and the allocation of seats are in part majoritarian and in part proportional. Such systems, it has been argued, offer the best solution to satisfy the

Lindberg, 2005, p. 45

Germany[103]. Hybrid systems, it has been argued, offer the best solution to satisfy the two main, though, contrary imperatives of representative justice and governing capacity[104].

[104] Shugart, Matthew S. and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds). 2001. *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts. January 1995. "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform". *International Political Science Review*. Issue 16.

p. 45. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

proportional. Such systems, it has been argued, offer the best solution to satisfy the two main, though contrary imperatives of representative justice and governing capacity (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995). Empirical cases have been rare, however,

Lindberg, 2005, p. 45

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be seen, any assessment of the performance of different electoral systems raises many concerns and questions. This is because there are several evaluative considerations and criteria, all of which rest on political or normative premises. It

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As many election scholars have pointed out, assessing the performance of different electoral systems is problematic because there are multiple evaluative considerations and criteria, all of which rest on political or normative premises. Moreover, many of the values that electoral systems are expected to fur-

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 193

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

I.   INTRODUCTION

Electoral systems have several consequences, of both a legal and political nature. The truth of this statement is revealed in the ever-increasing literature on electoral systems, which seeks to show precisely what these consequences are. This chapter

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7

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Electoral systems have political consequences. The truth of this statement is revealed in the burgeoning literature on electoral systems, which seeks to show precisely what these consequences are.

Farrell, 1997, p. 142

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systems, which seeks to show precisely what these consequences are. This chapter addresses various theoretical hypotheses regarding the effects of electoral systems.

p. 49

Based on an original data set of elections in Africa, this article addresses the orthodoxy of theoretical hypotheses regarding the effects of electoral systems. While Africanists assume that

Lindberg, 2005, p. 41

There are a number of consequences of electoral systems which we need to consider, among them: the effects on proportionality and on the number of parties resulting in the legislature.

In combination, these two consequences are said to play a major role in determining the overall stability of the system. It is usual to argue that, in choosing an electoral system, we face a trade-off: either the electoral system is proportional, because it facilitates the entry of minor parties and the representation of minority interests and produces a situation where the government system is unstable, or the electoral system is non-proportional and the governmental system is much more stable.

p. 49

the major points of disagreement between the authors. There are a number of consequences of electoral systems which we need to consider, among them: the effects on proportionality, on numbers of parties, and on the representation of women and minorities. These are

In combination, these three consequences are said to play a major role in determining the overall stability of the system. As was discussed in chapter 1, it is usual to argue that, in choosing an electoral system, we face a trade-off: either the electoral system is proportional – facilitating the entry of minor parties and the representation of minority interests – and produces a situation where the governmental system is unstable, or the electoral system is non-proportional and the governmental system is much more stable. In

Farrell, 1997, p. 142

The study of electoral systems can reveal a lot about political behaviour. The proportionality of the system plays a significant role in deciding who wins and who loses in the election game, on the composition of the parliament and the eventual government in terms of parties, and on the characteristics of the individual MPs. Debates over measures of proportionality and disproportionality

p. 49. Farrell is cited only at the end of the paragraph, after an uncited adoption from another source (see next fragment).

The study of electoral systems can reveal a lot about political behaviour. The proportionality of the system plays a significant role in deciding who wins and who loses in the election game, on the constellation of parties in parliament (and therefore also in government), and on the characteristics of the individual MPs. In turn, this

Farrell, 1997, pp. 167-168

individual MPs. Debates over measures of proportionality and disproportionality have been central components of electoral studies research for at least a generation. In turn, this raises questions relating to the degree of stability of the

p. 49

Debates over measures of proportionality and disproportionality have been central components of electoral studies research for at least a generation.
Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman, Conclusion: STV's Place in the Family of Electoral Systems. In: Bowler, Grofman, 2000, pp. 265-270; p. 265

The two main political consequences of electoral systems on which this chapter will focus is their effects on the proportionality or disproportionality of the electoral product and their effects on the party system, particularly the degree of multipartism in the electoral outcome. In evaluating any electoral system, there are

p. 50

THE two main political consequences of electoral systems on which this study focuses are (1) their effects on the proportionality or disproportionality of the electoral outcomes and (2) their effects on the party system, particularly the degree of multipartism and the
Lijphart, 1994, p. 57

multipartism in the electoral outcome. In evaluating any electoral system, there are two central questions. First, how proportional is it in translating popular votes to seats? Second, what are the effects of the electoral system on the political system, such as, for example, the numbers of parties in the legislature and the degree of government stability? Douglas Rae sees the first question as reflecting the 'proximal' or short-run, effects of electoral systems and the second question as reflecting the 'distal', or long-run, effects[107].

[107] Rae, Douglas. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

p. 50. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

In evaluating any electoral system, there are two central questions. First, how proportional is it in translating popular votes into seats? Second, what are the effects of the electoral system on the political system, such as, for example, the numbers of parties in the legislature and the degree of governmental stability? Rae (1967) sees the first question as reflecting the "proximal," or short-run, effects of electoral systems and the second question as reflecting the "distal," or long-run, effects. For the most part, STV is included in the general

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, p. 20

Exactly how the transformation process of votes into seats in the process of electing politicians to office occurs, varies from one system to the next. In some systems great effort is made to ensure that the number of seats each party wins reflects as closely as possible the number of votes it has received. In other systems greater importance is attached to ensuring that one party has a clear majority of seats over its competitors, thereby aiming at increasing the prospect of strong and stable government. The first of these systems is said to be 'proportional', in contrast to the others which are 'non-proportional' electoral systems. The two more common forms of non-proportional systems, FPTP, the alternative vote and the second ballot, were discussed in the second chapter. The distinguishing feature these systems share is that they do not aim at a proportional result; rather they place more attention to the question of governmental stability. In contrast, proportional systems aim specifically at achieving proportionality in the electoral result, although to varying degrees and successes. The general orthodoxy is thus

pp. 50-51

Exactly how this translation occurs varies from one system to the next. In some systems great effort is made to ensure that the number of seats each party wins reflects as closely as possible the number of votes it has received. In other systems greater importance is attached to ensuring that one party has a clear majority of seats over its competitors, thereby (hopefully) increasing the prospect of strong and stable government. The first of these systems is said to be 'proportional', in contrast to the others which are 'non-proportional' electoral systems.

currently in use (Figure 1.1). First, there are the two more common forms of non-proportional systems, FPTP and the variants of majoritarian systems (alternative vote and second ballot). The distinguishing feature these systems share is that they do not aim at a proportional result; instead, far more attention is paid to the question of governmental stability and – generally being based on single-

By contrast, the far more common family of proportional systems do aim specifically at achieving degrees of proportionality in the electoral result, although with mixed success, as we shall see. Chapters

Farrell, 1997, p. 5

Any discussion about electoral systems and their reform must deal with the issues of stability and the representation of interests of minorities. One is often seen, at least partially, a trade-off against the other. However, Farrell argues, this is

p. 51. Farrell is cited after two sentences, in a way that suggests only the following, but not the preceding contents are taken from this source.

As pointed out earlier, central to any discussion about electoral systems and their reform are questions of stability and the representation of minority interests. One is often seen as, at least partially, a trade-off against the other. A main contention of this book is that this

Farrell, 1997, p. 6

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posited by Farrell as the basic distinction between a 'microcosm' and a 'principal agent' concept of representation. The former notion is associated with proportional electoral systems, the second with non-proportional systems. John Adams, one of the founding fathers of the USA, was one of the first exponents of the microcosm view who said that parliament "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them"[110]. Thus, parliament should be a "representative sample" of the population. As Lord Plant[111]

[110] McLean, I., A. McMillan, and B. Monroe, eds. 1996. *A Mathematical Approach to Proportional Representation: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll.* Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Page 173.

p. 51. Although Farrell is mentioned at the beginning of the depicted passage of text, a reference to the source is only made in footnote no. 111.

The basic distinction is between a 'microcosm' and a 'principal-agent' conception of representation (McLean, 1991; Reeve and Ware, 1992). The first of these is associated with proponents of proportional electoral systems, the second with supporters of non-proportional systems. A classical exponent of the microcosm view was John Adams, one of the founding fathers of the USA, who said that parliament 'should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them' (quoted in way, parliament should be a 'representative sample' of the population. Obviously it is impossible to achieve a perfect representative

Farrell, 1997, p. 6

In contrast, according to the principal-agent conception, it is the decisions of the parliament that matter. The representative is elected by the people to represent their interests. It is less important that the parliament is statistically representative of voters. What matters is that it acts properly in the interests of citizens.

Iain McLean observes that each "seems entirely reasonable but they are inconsistent". He continues to say, "the PR school looks at the composition of a parliament; majoritarians look at its decisions"[112]. It is not possible to draw conclusions as to which is better. Empirical evidence however shows that some systems are associated more with governmental stability while other systems promote smaller parties better than others.

[112] McLean, I., A. McMillan, and B. Monroe, eds. 1996. *A Mathematical Approach to Proportional Representation: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll.* Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Page 172, 175.

p. 52. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

but, according to the principal-agent conception, it is the decisions of the parliament that matter. The basis of the principal-agent conception is the notion of one person acting on behalf of another. The representative is elected by the people to represent their interests. In ing it is seen to be taking decisions on behalf of the voters. It is less important that the parliament is statistically representative of voters, and more important that it acts properly in the interests of the citizens,

In his excellent summary of these two positions, Iain McLean (1991: 172) observes that each 'seems entirely reasonable, but they are inconsistent'. There is no reconciliation: either you support one

'The PR school looks at the composition of a parliament; majoritarians look at its decisions' (McLean, 1991: 175). On this basis, therefore, we can see that it is not possible to draw firm conclusions as to which is better, a proportional or a non-proportional electoral system. There are, however, other more empirical areas where conclusions can be drawn. Some systems are apparently associated with greater degrees of governmental stability while other systems promote smaller parties better than others. There are effects on the

Farrell, 1997, p. 7

The principal advantage which PR systems are supposed to have over non-PR systems is that, on average, they produce more proportional results by minimising the distortion between the number of votes a party wins and the number of seats it will eventually have in parliament.

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How proportional are proportional representation (PR) systems? The principal advantage which PR systems are supposed to have over non-PR systems is that, on average, they produce more proportional results, i.e. they minimize the distortion between the number of votes a party wins and the number of seats it ends up with in parliament.

Farrell, 1997, p. 143

systems at the comparative level. There is still a great need to apply a more rigorous test across a wide range of different electoral systems in various countries over a long period of time. This way we can get a true picture not only of whether PR systems produce more proportional results than non-PR systems, but also about which PR system is the more proportional.

The comparative assessment of the proportionality of electoral systems which has been done until now has been dominated by debates over, primarily, which factors most affect levels of proportionality, and secondly, which is the most appropriate index to adopt. This has thus produced different rankings for the various electoral systems.

A recurrent problem identified in all literature reviewed is how to include STV in any evaluation such as this. On the implications of different STV systems for

p. 53

It is now time to produce more systematic evidence, to apply a more rigorous test across a wide range of different electoral systems in various countries over a long period of time. This way we can get a true picture not only of whether PR systems produce more proportional results than non-PR systems, but also about which PR system is the more proportional.

Of course, things are not as easy as they may seem. The comparative assessment of the proportionality of electoral systems has been dominated by a series of debates (sometimes rancorous) over methodology: first, on the issue of which factors most affect levels of proportionality, and second, on the issue of which is the most appropriate index to adopt. Given the disagreement over measuring techniques, there should be little surprise that this produces different rankings for the various electoral systems.

to rank the different electoral formulae. In particular, there is a problem over how to include STV in any evaluation. As Lijphart

Farrell, 1997, pp. 143-144

any evaluation such as this. On the implications of different STV systems for proportionality, the study of electoral systems has progressed far in a short period of time. Only a few years ago, Gallagher observed that "there is surprisingly little discussion of what exactly we mean by proportionality and how we should measure it"[113]. As Lijphart observes, many people ignore STV altogether and focus instead on the list systems[114]. Thus Rae makes the admission that because of this, "[i]t is not clear how this arrangement is likely compare with other PR formulae"[115], and therefore does not attempt an overall assessment of the degree to which STV is more or less proportional than list systems. Instead he merely concludes that "in general, the Irish formula behaves like any other sort of proportional representation. It operates quite proportionally"[116].

[113] Gallagher, Michael. 1991. "Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies* Issue 10. Page 33.

[114] Lijphart, Arend. 1986. "Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas." In *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon.

[115] Rae, Douglas. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 38.

[116] Rae, Douglas. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 111.

pp. 53-54. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

On the second major issue—the implications of different STV systems for proportionality—the study of electoral systems has progressed far in a short period of time. Only a few years ago, Gallagher (1991) observed that "there is surprisingly little discussion of what exactly we mean by proportionality and how we should measure it" (33). Research by Gallagher and others

siderable difficulty with including STV in any evaluation. As Lijphart (1986) has observed, many simply ignore STV altogether for this reason and instead focus on the list systems.

proached this problem in a number of ways. Rae (1967) makes the admission that because of this, "[i]t is not quite clear how this arrangement is likely to compare with other PR formulae" (38), and accordingly he does not attempt an overall assessment of the degree to which STV is more or less proportional than list systems. Instead, he merely concludes that "in general, the Irish formula behaves like any other sort of proportional representation. It operates quite proportionally" (111).

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, pp. 29, 21

Problems with assessing the proportionality of STV is the relatively low level of district magnitude. This means that STV tends to be labelled less proportional. Taagepera and Shugart and Katz term it "quasi-proportional"[117]. According to Lijphart, this is inevitable because higher district magnitudes entail large numbers of candidates and thereby "impose heavy burdens on the voters who have to rank order the candidates"[118]. Some authors such as Jean Blondel and even Lijphart in

[117] Taagepera Rein & Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Page 207. And, Richard S. Katz. 1984. "The Single Transferable Vote and Proportional Representation." In *Choosing and Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*, edited by Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman. New York: Praeger.

[118] Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 30.

p. 54. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

There are two main difficulties with assessing the proportionality of STV. First, the relatively low level of district magnitude (at least as used in Ireland, which is the usual focus of attention) means that STV tends to be labeled as less proportional or—as the phrase goes—quasi-proportional (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 207; also Katz 1984). Of course, one way around this problem

In Lijphart's study, the STV systems have the lowest district magnitudes of all the PR systems. He argues that this is inevitable because higher district magnitudes entail large numbers of candidates and thereby "impose heavy burdens on the voters who have to rank order the candidates" (1994, 30). As

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, pp. 21, 30

order the candidates"[118]. Some authors such as Jean Blondel and even Lijphart in his later work have gone round this problem by ignoring the district magnitude and instead focussed on the theoretical aspects of how the different electoral formulae vary over proportionality[119]. It must be said however, that Blondel's conclusion that STV is the most proportional of the PR systems has not found general support with his academic counterparts[120].

Furthermore, STV is quintessentially a candidate-based system. Lijphart solves this by making the assumption that voters cast their votes entirely within the party lines (as in Malta), thus construing the vote simply as a party vote[121].

[119] Blondel, Jean. 1969. *An Introduction to Comparative Government*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
[120] Lijphart A., 'The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws', American Political Science Review, Volume 84, No.2, June 1990. Page 230.

[121] Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 159.

pp. 54-55. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

way around this problem is simply to ignore district magnitude and instead to focus on the theoretical aspects of how the different electoral formulae vary over proportionality. This is the approach adopted by Jean Blondel (1969); however, his conclusion that STV is the most proportional of the PR systems (and that largest remainder is the least) has not found general support.

The second problem with STV is that quintessentially it is a candidate-based system: unlike the list systems where voters are ally'. Lijphart (1994:159; 1986) suggests a way around the problem. He makes the 'simplifying assumption' that voters cast their votes entirely within party lines (which is pretty much the case in Malta), and that therefore the vote can be construed as a 'party vote'. This

Farrell, 1997, pp. 144-145

Proportionality presupposes the relevance of party as a basis for allocation of political offices and power. Because voters rank candidates, STV does not necessarily require political parties as a basis for allocating seats. Some have even suggested that it is inappropriate to speak of an aggregate-level party vote in the context of the STV system. Yet nothing could be further from the political reality of elections in Malta. Much of the discussion in Malta focuses on the relationship between the parties' respective vote and seat percentages and particularly the first-count votes that a party's candidates have received collectively. The parliamentary election is primarily about parties winning control of the parliament and thus over government[122].

p. 55. The footnote does not refer to Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000.

Proportionality presupposes the relevance of party as a basis for allocation of political offices and power. Because voters rank candidates, STV does not necessarily require political parties as a basis for allocating seats. Some have even suggested that it is inappropriate to speak of an aggregate-level party vote in the context of the STV system, which is the quintessential candidate-centered system. Yet nothing could be further from the political reality of elections in Malta. Politicians, voters, and political analysts in Malta consis-

much of this discussion in Malta focuses on the relationship between the parties' respective vote and seat percentages and particularly the first-count votes that a party's candidates have collectively amassed. This is not surprising, as the parliamentary election is first and foremost about winning control of Parliament and thus over government, which in a parliamentary system is

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 197

Following the above theoretical assessment of the likely electoral outcomes in terms of proportionality from using each formula, the issue arises as to the degree to which reality matches up with theory. This is where one must delve into the

p. 57

This ranking is based on a theoretical assessment of the likely electoral outcomes from using each of these formulae. The problem next becomes one of how to assess the degree to which reality matches up with theory. Prima facie, it might appear a relatively

Farrell, 1997, p. 145

[128] As seen in the last chapter, modified Sainte-Laguë in practice is more often used in a modified form which uses 1.4 instead of 1 as the first divisor, thereby making it harder for small parties to gain their first seats and hence reducing the proportionality of the election result to some extent.

p. 57

The Sainte-Laguë formula, in the original form proposed by its inventor, uses the odd-integer divisor series 1, 3, 5, 7, and so forth. In practice, it is used only in a modified form which uses 1.4 instead of 1 as the first divisor. Its sequential procedure for allocating seats to parties is identical fied form in which the first divisor is raised from 1 to 1.4, thereby making it harder for small parties to gain their first seats—and hence reducing the proportionality of the election result to some extent.[20]

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 153, 23

Left column:

one must first have access to a suitable measure, or index, of proportionality, and second, a ranking which can take account of all the possible influences on proportionality.

Over the years, a number of different measures of proportionality have been developed by Rae in 1969, Loosemore and Hanby in 1971, Gallagher in 1991, and Lijphart in 1994 called the 'Rae Index'[133], 'Loosemore-Hanby Index'[134], the 'Least-Square Index'[135], and the 'Largest Deviation Index' respectively. Lijphart finds that all indices are "highly and significantly correlated", but he has a clear preference for Gallagher's index[136]. The principal advantage of this index is that the presence of small parties does not distort it to the extent that it distorts other indexes, as does the Rae Index, which is too sensitive to the presence of very small parties[137]. Furthermore, it does not suffer from the defect suffered by the Loosemore-Hanby index, which is influenced by systems containing large numbers of parties.

[135] The Least-squares index is calculated by squaring the vote-seat difference for each party; sum them; divide the total by two, and then take the square root.

p. 58. The footnotes do not refer to Farrell, 1997.

Right column:

not so simple for two main reasons: first, we need access to a suitable measure, or index, of proportionality, and second, we need a ranking which can take account of all the possible influences on proportionality, not just electoral formula, but also district magnitude and other

Over the years, a number of different measures of proportionality have been developed by Rae (1967 – the Rae index), Loosemore and Hanby (1971 – the Loosemore-Hanby index), Gallagher (1991 – the Least-squares index), and Lijphart (1994 – the Largest-deviation index). They will not be discussed here. In his comprehensive overview, Lijphart (1994: 67) finds that all four indices are 'highly and significantly correlated', but he has a clear preference for Gallagher's Least-squares index.[1] Table 7.1 makes use of the Least-

the square root (Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1994: 60–1). The principal advantage of this index over the others is that it is not so easily distorted by the presence of small parties (a particular problem with the Rae index), nor has it too many problems with systems containing large numbers of parties (a particular problem with the Loosemore-Hanby index).

The Least-squares index is calculated as follows: square the vote–seat differences for each party (ignoring 'others' – usually parties with less than 0.5 per cent of the vote); sum them; divide the total by two; and then take the square root (Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1994: 60–1). The principal

Farrell, 1997, pp. 145, 168

[133] The Rae index uses the average of deviations; it sums the difference between the vote percentages and seat percentages and then divides by the number of parties.

p. 58

oldest measure (I), proposed by Douglas W. Rae,[1] simply uses the average of the deviations; that is, it sums the absolute differences between the vote percentages (v_i) and seat percentages (s_i), and then divides by the number of parties (n):

Lijphart, 1994, p. 58

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[137] Richard S. Katz opines, 'at the extreme, if the infinite number of hypothetical parties that receive no votes and obtain no seats is included, every electoral system would appear perfectly proportional'. *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*. 1980. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Page 140.

p. 58

systems. As Richard S. Katz has pointed out, 'at the extreme, if the infinite number of (hypothetical) parties that receive no votes and obtain no seats is included, every electoral system would appear perfectly proportional'.[2] Rae tries to avoid this problem by dis-

2. Richard S. Katz, *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 140.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 58, 186

In the study of electoral systems as political institutions, one of the main focuses has been on how they shape the political fragmentation and therefore the political conflict structure in a society. The level of party fragmentation is important for possible future government formations. With only two parties one can expect that one achieves the majority and forms the government. The more parties there are, the lower the likelihood is that a party gets a majority to form a single-party government. And it is said by advocates of majoritarian electoral systems, that a clear majority is essential for government effectiveness[140].   Advocates of proportional representation on the other hand highlight the importance of social and political representation as a democratic value of an electoral system which is best fulfilled in a proportional representation system when more than two parties exist and the political spectrum might be represented better.   Thus, one would be

[140] Lutz, Georg. 2001. "Measuring Electoral Systems by Comparing Outcomes in the Same Area under Different Rules", *Electoral Reforms in Stable Democracies*, Paper presented in August 2001 at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR).

p. 59. The source is only cited once in the middle of the paragraph, without quotation marks, despite the almost word-for-word adoption of text.

In the research on political institutions one of the main focuses has been on how political institutions shape the political fragmentation and therefore the political conflict structure in a society. The party fragmentation is important for possible government formation. With only two parties one can expect that one achieves the majority and forms the government. The more party there are, the lower is the likelihood that a party gets a majority to form a single-party government. And it is said by advocates of majoritarian electoral systems, that a clear majority is essential for government effectiveness. Advocates of proportional representation on the other hand highlight the importance of social and political representation as a democratic value of an electoral system which is best fulfilled in a proportional representation system when more than two parties exist and the political spectrum might be represented better.

Lutz, 2001, p. 2

inclined to think that electoral systems which are more proportional should coincide with more fragmented party systems.

In the 1950s, the French political scientist, Maurice Duverger, referring in particular to FPTP, argued that non-proportional electoral systems 'favour' two party systems, while proportional electoral systems 'favour' multi-party systems[141]. He argued this on the basis of two arguments. First, the way non-PR systems work are bound to render results which result in fewer parties in parliament. This because it is more difficult for smaller parties to win seats under such systems. A second argument focuses on the 'psychological' aspect of election campaigns. According to Duverger, the way the system works renders voters aware of the fact that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted vote[142]. Consequently,

[141] Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern*

pp. 59-60. Footnote no. 142 does not refer to Farrell, 1997. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

We might expect – almost by definition, as it were – that electoral systems which are more proportional should coincide with more fragmented party systems. In the 1950s the French political scientist, Maurice Duverger (1954), put forward the proposition that non-proportional electoral systems (he referred specifically to FPTP) 'favour' two-party systems, while proportional electoral systems 'favour' multi-party systems. There are two parts to this argument which can be summarized by looking at the case of non-proportional electoral systems. First, there is the fact that, because it is more difficult for smaller parties to win seats under non-PR systems, the *mechanics* of these systems are bound to result in fewer parties in parliament. Second, there is also a *psychological* aspect, in the sense that voters are aware of the fact that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted vote and therefore they are less inclined to bother voting for

Farrell, 1997, p. 149

However, the fact remains that wherever there is a proportional electoral system there is generally a greater likelihood of finding more parties represented in the parliament., and wherever there is a non-proportional electoral system, two-party systems normally reign. One need only mention the US Congress which is dominated by the Republicans and Democrats and the UK House of Commons dominated by Conservatives and Labour[146] as two of the concrete examples.

pp. 60-61. Farrell, 1997 is cited in the preceding paragraph. The footnote does not refer to any source.

this should not distract us from the fact that wherever there is a proportional electoral system there is a greater likelihood of finding more parties represented in the parliament, and wherever there is a non-proportional electoral system, we are more likely to find a two-party system. Obvious examples of the latter include the US Congress, dominated by the Republicans and the Democrats, and the UK House of Commons, dominated by the Conservatives and Labour. Of

Farrell, 1997, p. 150

This is further evidenced by the situation in Malta where STV coexists with a two-party system. It is clear that the two-party system has allowed STV to remain in force, so it can be said to represent a democratic political choice that the people of Malta have made through their Parliament. Therefore we can conclude that STV does not necessarily lead to multipartism and the attendant problems of fragmentation and government instability. STV, as a system, can be said to have failed is when the mechanics of the system resulted in the losing party in first-preference votes in the nation as a whole gaining control of the government[149].

[149] Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. *STV's Place in the Family of Electoral Systems.* United States of America: University of Michigan Press.

pp. 61-62. The footnote only refers to the authors of the compilation, without any page reference. While this passage of text might not qualify as plagiarism in the strict sense, the reference is still misleading for readers and does not show due diligence in the writing process.

from looking at the Maltese case that STV can coexist with a two-party system, that is, that STV does not necessarily lead to multipartism and the attendant problems of fragmentation and government instability. Still, there is no

cally, however, is that the two-party system (i.e., the two major parties) has allowed STV to remain in force, so it can be said to represent a democratic political choice that the people of Malta have made through their Parliament.

way or another is not possible. STV can be said to have failed when the mechanics of the system resulted in the losing party (in first-preference votes in the nation as a whole) gaining control of the government. Although such per-

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 202

II. III.   THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES

How can political parties of unequal size in a political system be counted? If there

p. 62

THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES

The practical problem in measuring the number of parties is how to count parties of unequal size and, in particular, how to

Lijphart, 1994, p. 67

How can political parties of unequal size in a political system be counted? If there are two large parties and three small ones, are we dealing with a two-party system or a five-party system? A system of weighing the parties in a system is necessary.

p. 62

How should we count political parties in a party system? If there are two large parties and three small ones, are we dealing with a two-party system or a five-party system? This is a very important question,

Taagepera, Soberg Shugart, 1989, p. 77

For in cases like the British party system, only recently has the Liberal Democrat Party begun to be recognised. The system throughout the twentieth century has always been described as a two-party system.

p. 62

sary. For instance, the British party system has long been described as a two-party system even though, throughout the twentieth century, there have always been more, and usually quite a few more,

Lijphart, 1994, p. 67

One must primarily seek to make a distinction between two-party and multi-party systems whether in parliamentary or presidential systems where cabinet formation is the objective of the former and legislative support for presidents is that of the latter. According to Lijphart, 'the variable that underlies the distinction is the number of parties'[150].

pp. 62-63. Lijphart, 1994 is cited in quotation marks only at the end of the paragraph. The wording ("According to Lijphart") indicates that only the following, but not the preceding contents are taken from this source.

legislative majority. In addition to the distinction between two-party and multi-party systems, a further distinction must be made between moderate and extreme multi-party systems—with commensurate consequences for cabinet formation in parliamentary systems and legislative support for presidents in presidential systems. The variable that underlies both of the distinctions is the number of parties.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 67

Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera have devised an index which measures the 'effective' number of parties, based on the number of different parties in parliament and their different sizes. This index is calculated by using the formula:

p. 63

Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera have devised an index which measures the 'effective' number of parties, based on the number of parties in parliament and their different sizes.[2] Using this index, for

Farrell, 1997, p. 150

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of the social cleavages in a country[151]. As Rae points out, "party systems are influenced by many variables-social, economic, legal and political. [The] electoral law…is to be counted only one of many determining forces. And it is, secondly, impossible to sort out all the contributing factors, or to assign even approximate weights to them. Worse yet, electoral laws are themselves shaped by party systems"[152].

[152] Rae, Douglas W. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.* 1967. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Page 141

p. 63. Adoption of the quotation with the same brackets and deletions as in Lijphart, 1990.

multipartism on the other. Rae (p. 141) correctly points out that "party systems are influenced by many variables—social, economic, legal, and political. [The] electoral law . . . is to be counted only one of many determining forces. And it is, secondly, impossible to sort out all the contributing factors, or to assign even approximate weights to them. Worse yet, electoral laws are themselves shaped by party systems."

Lijphart, 1990, pp. 488, 490

One would suppose that, since the differences in disproportionality among PR systems are smaller than those between PR and plurality-majority, one should expect even smaller differences with regard to multipartism. Rae reports that in accordance with his hypothesis, highest-averages formulae are associated with lower multipartism than largest- remainder formulae as they give overall figures of 3.57 and 4.00 parties respectively[157]. However, Rae's analysis of elections between the periods of 1945-1964 and 1965-1985 is incomplete, and thus, according to Lijphart, when this data is added and "the numerous misclassifications are corrected, the difference disappears". Thus he finds that the

[157] Rae, Douglas W. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. 1967. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Page 106

p. 64. Adoption of literature reference. Lijphart is only cited in quotation marks at the end of the depicted passage, and the wording ("and thus, according to Lijphart") suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

Since the differences in disproportionality among PR systems are smaller than those between PR and plurality-majority, we should also expect more modest differences with regard to multipartism. Rae (p. 106) reports that in accordance with his hypothesis, highest-average formulas are associated with lower multipartism than largest-remainder formulas—3.57 and 4.00 parties respectively. However, when the missing 1945–64 data and the 1965–85 data are added and the numerous misclas-

Lijphart, 1990, p. 490

However, one may refer to Riker who asks his readers to bear in mind that the theory that disproportionality should reduce multipartism, is based on the assumption of strategic behaviour. When smaller parties are expected to be discriminated against, voters as well as politicians, political activists, and money givers will favour the larger parties[159].

[159] Riker, William H. 1986. "Duverger's Law Revisited." In *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon. Pages 33-41

p. 65. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

In the first place, the hypothesis that disproportionality should reduce multi-partism is based on the assumption of strategic behavior. When smaller parties are expected to be discriminated against, voters, as well as politicians, political activists, and money givers will favor the larger parties (Gunther 1989; Riker 1986, 33–41). The finding on the effect of ballot

Lijphart, 1990, p. 493

Furthermore, since the focus above has been on measuring the electoral system's long range effect on the party system, multipartism has been consistently appraised in terms of the effective number of 'elective' parties. It is logical to expect a stronger impact of disproportionality on the effective number of 'legislative' parties. This because legislative parties are affected not only by what Lijphart calls "strategic responses to the expectation of discrimination against

p. 65. Adoption of literature reference. Lijphart is only cited in quotation marks at the end of the depicted passage, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

The third qualification is that since the focus has been on gauging the electoral system's long-range effect on the party system, multipartism has been consistently measured in terms of the effective number of *elective* parties. It is logical to expect a stronger impact of disproportionality on the effective number of *legislative* parties because the latter is affected not only by strategic responses to the expecta-

Lijphart, 1990, p. 493

II. IV. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DISPROPORTIONALITY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

It is evident that proportionality is one of the most important aims of electoral systems. The analysis of the degrees of disproportionality is important in order to determine to what extent this aim is realised. It is necessary to determine how the different dimensions of electoral systems contribute to the proportionality and disproportionality of election outcomes. Lijphart attributes the notion of disproportionality the status of a dependent variable. It would be useful to adopt

p. 67. Lijphart is mentioned after a few sentences, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DISPROPORTIONALITY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

proportionality is one of the aims, albeit not necessarily the most important aim, of most electoral systems. The analysis of the degrees of disproportionality is important in order to determine to what extent this aim is realized. Moreover, it is important to determine how the different dimensions of electoral systems contribute to the proportionality or disproportionality of election outcomes. In this analysis, disproportionality is of intrinsic interest as the dependent variable—the focus of what we try to explain in

Lijphart, 1994, p. 75

Thus, disproportionality serves as a hypothetical link between the electoral system variables and the resultant multipartism. For, as was portrayed above, the disproportionality of the electoral system reduces the number of parties by mechanical and psychological means.

p. 67

the different aspects of party systems. In this analysis, disproportionality serves as the hypothesized link between the electoral system variables and the party system variables: the hypothesis is that it is the disproportionality of electoral systems that, by mechanical and psychological means, reduces the number of parties

Lijphart, 1994, p. 75

Lijphart also characterises the relationship between the two dependent variables as a two-way one. Both can affect the degree of the other. However, the effect on each other works in opposite directions. For while disproportionality decreases multipartism, to some extent, multipartism increases disproportionality. This is especially clear in plurality systems where their high disproportionality accounts, via the effect of strategic behaviour, for their relatively small effective number of elective parties. Strategic voting is neutralised in majority systems, which can therefore combine high disproportionality with high elective multipartism. And the substantial differences in disproportionality among PR systems are apparently not large enough to produce either commensurate differences in strategic behaviour or, as a result, commensurate differences in elective multipartism.
To sum up, electoral systems display wide and predictable differences in disproportionality, smaller differences in multipartism that are the direct effect of disproportionality, and even smaller differences in elective multipartism due to strategic calculations by elites and voters.

pp. 67-68. Although Lijphart is mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, a corresponding footnote is missing. One would assume that especially in the last section (beginning with "To sum up"), the author drew her own conclusions.

Plurality systems are an exception: their high disproportionality accounts, via the effect of strategic behavior, for their relatively small effective number of elective parties. Strategic voting is neutralized in majority systems, which can therefore combine high disproportionality with high elective multipartism. And the substantial differences in disproportionality among PR systems are apparently not large enough to produce either commensurate differences in strategic behavior or, as a result, commensurate differences in elective multipartism.

To sum up, electoral systems display wide and predictable differences in disproportionality, smaller differences in multipartism that are the direct effect of disproportionality, and even smaller differences in elective multipartism due to strategic calculations by elites and voters.

Lijphart, 1990, p. 494

As shall be seen in the following chapter, the direct influence of one of the electoral system dimensions, the 'effective threshold', on multipartism, is actually stronger than the effect of disproportionality. Similarly, it shall be seen how presidential governments and categorical ballots decrease multipartism. There is no direct link between these two variables and disproportionality, but, via the party system, they indirectly become the connecting factor. Hence, according to Lijphart, one can further infer that presidentialism and categorical ballots decrease disproportionality. On the other hand it will be seen how another variable, the

p. 68. Lijphart is only mentioned after a few sentences, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

Chapter 5 will show that the direct influence of one of the electoral system dimensions, the effective threshold, on multipartism is actually stronger than the effect of disproportionality.
in Chapter 2. Both presidential government and categorical ballots are hypothesized to decrease multipartism. There is no plausible direct link between these two variables and disproportionality, but indirectly, via the party system, there could be a causal connection. Hence we can infer the further hypotheses that presidentialism and categorical ballots decrease disproportionality.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 77. Poor readability due to printing errors in the book.

While it is true that the prospects for a stable and efficient government are determined by many factors other than merely the electoral system, the results that an electoral system produces, can contribute to stability in many important aspects.

p. 70

The prospects for a stable and efficient government are determined by many factors other than the electoral system, but the results a system produces can contribute to stability in a number of important respects. The key questions in this

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see https://web.archive.org/web/20030111024258/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esa04.htm

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The salient feature of the proportional vision is representative justice. Thus, the number of parties competing for votes and winning legislative seats are typically greater than in majoritarian systems. PR systems are thought to lead to legislative-executive deadlocks and unstable coalition governments. Contrastingly, plurality in single-member constituencies and majority in single- or multi-member constituencies, are said to be associated with substantial legislative majorities and

p. 70

The overall imperative of the proportional vision, is representative justice. It is not somewhat. The numbers of parties competing for votes and winning legislative seats are typically greater than in majoritarian systems. Orthodoxy has it that there is a trade off between representative justice and governing capacity. PR systems are thought to lead to legislative-executive deadlocks in presidential systems and short-lived unstable coalition governments in parliamentary systems hence lower

Plurality in single-member constituencies and majority in single-, or multi-member constituencies, are thought to be associated with substantial legislative majorities

Lindberg, 2005, pp. 45, 55

Reynolds[174] regards the relationship between stability and proportionality as being whether the people perceive the system as fair, whether the government can efficiently enact legislation and govern, and whether the system avoids discriminating against particular parties or interest groups. The perception of whether results are 'fair' or not varies from country to country. For instance, in the 1951 and 1974 general elections in Britain, the party winning the most votes in the country as a whole, won fewer seats than their opponents, but this was considered more a natural trait of a basically sound system of the FPTP, than an outright unfairness. Conversely, Mongolia, allowed the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party to win 92% of the seats with only 57% of the votes. This was considered by many to be not just unfair but dangerous to democracy, and the electoral system was changed for the following general elections which were held in 1996.

pp. 70-71. Reynolds is cited at the beginning of the paragraph, but since the text is almost a word-for-word copy, it would have been necessary to cite in quotation marks.

in a number of important respects. The key questions in this regard are whether people perceive the system to be fair, whether government can efficiently enact legislation and govern, and whether the system avoids discriminating against particular parties or interest groups. The perception of whether results are Fair or not varies widely from country to country. Twice in Britain - in 1951 and 1974 - the party winning the most votes in the country as a whole won fewer seats than their opponents, but this was considered more a quirk of a basically sound system, see First Past the Post (FPTP), than an outright unfairness which should be reversed. Conversely, in Mongolia in 1992 the system (the Block Vote - see Block Vote) allowed the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party to win 92% of the seats with only 57% of the votes. This was considered by many to be not merely unfair but dangerous to democracy, and the electoral system was consequently changed for the elections of 1996.

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20030111024258/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esa04.htm

Based on the argument that PR systems tend to produce more proportional results, one must however state that while few would dispute that having a more representative assembly is a good thing, there is considerable dispute over the degree to which an assembly can operate effectively. Therefore one could conclude that there can either be a representative parliament which elects a similarly representative government, or, alternatively, a strong and stable government. Many say that there is a trade-off between representative justice and

p. 71

to support the contention that PR systems tend to produce more proportional results. In general, parliaments elected under propor-

While few would dispute that having a more representative assembly is a good thing, there is considerable dispute over the degree to which such an assembly can operate effectively. As we saw earlier, this issue is usually presented in terms of a trade-off: either you can have a representative parliament which elects a similarly representative government, or you can have strong and stable government; you

Farrell, 1997, p. 153

government. Many say that there is a trade-off between representative justice and stability, one existing at the exclusion of the other.

p. 71

are typically greater than in majoritarian systems. Orthodoxy has it that there is a trade off between representative justice and governing capacity. PR systems are

Lindberg, 2005, p. 45

This statement for mutual exclusion necessitates an examination of the arguments which say that PR systems promote instability. One of the first arguments that proponents of this trade-off come up with, is that PR produces coalition governments which are unstable because they are made up of several parties, and therefore governments change more often.

However, one can on the other hand argue that to rigorously assess the stability of government in terms of how long it stays in government is not the right approach to adopt[175]. For the definition of what results in a change of government can vary between being a general election or a new prime minister, even a cabinet reshuffle. Furthermore, Farrell asks for allowance to be made for systems like Germany or

[175] Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. 1990. *Multiparty Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

pp. 71-72. Farrell is only mentioned at the end of the paragraph, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied. Adoption of literature reference.

with four of the main points supporting the argument that PR promotes instability. These are as follows:

1 PR produces coalition governments which are unstable by virtue of being made up of several parties, and therefore governments tend to change more often.

To counteract the first main area of criticism, to rigorously assess the stability of government in terms of how long it stays in office is fraught with difficulties (e.g. Laver and Schofield, 1991). What defines a change of government: an election, a new prime minister, a cabinet reshuffle? For instance, according to some definitions, the

Farrell, 1997, p. 154

A second argument is that coalition governments are not accountable, because they are formed on the basis of backroom deals between party leaders after the election. Hence the parties' manifesto promises are forgotten in the struggle to gain power and the voters' wishes are ignored.

Gallagher[176] created a table of the variations in government longevity in relation to coalition. With 94.7% of its elections producing a legislative majority for one party, Britain lies on the more stable end of the spectrum. However, Austria, Iceland the Netherlands and Luxembourg all of which use PR, have far less single party majorities in parliament and thus result to be more stable. In other words, while FPTP helps to promote governmental stability, it is quite possible for PR systems to have the same result.

[176] Gallagher, Michael. 1995. *Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities.* Limerick: Political Studies Association of Ireland Press. Pages 327-328; Table 12.2.

p. 72. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

2 Coalition governments are not accountable, having been formed on the basis of backroom deals between party leaders after the election; the parties' manifesto promises are forgotten in the rush to gain power; the voters' wishes are ignored.

Table 7.3 provides some indication of the variations in government longevity and their relation to coalition (see also Gallagher *et al.*, 1995: 327–8). As expected, with 94.7 per cent of its elections producing a legislative majority for one party, Britain lies on the more stable end of the spectrum. The significant point, however, is that it does not have the *most* stable record. It is equalled or surpassed by Austria, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, all of which use PR and have far less frequent single-party majorities in parliament. In other words, the evidence in Table 7.3 suggests that while FPTP helps to promote governmental longevity (and hence 'stability'), it is quite possible for PR systems to have the same result.

Farrell, 1997, pp. 154-155

In coalition what matters is who can strike the better deal. However, what happens often is that coalition deals between parties are generally struck before the elections so voters know what they are voting for[177]. Thus, Gallagher cautions that "we should not get too bewitched by an image of the political future of most European states being settled not by the electorate but by the wheeling and dealing of party leaders"[178].

[178] Gallagher, Michael. 1995. "Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities." Limerick: Political Studies Association of Ireland Press. Page 221.

pp. 72-73. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source. The author wrongly copied the page no. of Roberts's instead of Gallagher's work.

outcome; what matters is who can strike the better deal. As always it this way, but equally there are examples of coalition bargains between parties being struck *before* the election, so voters know what they are voting for. For that matter, in systems where coalitions are of coalition formation can be entirely predictable: 'Thus we should not get too bewitched by an image of the political future of most European states being settled not by the electorate but by the wheeling and dealing of party leaders' (Gallagher *et al.*, 1995: 303). Furthermore, as Geoffrey K. Roberts (1975: 221) has noted: 'British

Farrell, 1997, p. 155

Moreover, while non-PR systems could have a good record in producing safe legislative majorities and therefore in facilitating the implementation of manifesto promises, there is a question mark over the extent to which this is a sufficient indicator of government stability. For instance the government may be stable because it has a majority of seats, but to what extent is it stable in terms of the number of votes? The UK government elected in 1992 had just the support of 41.9% of the vote. By contrast, other governments elected around the same time were far more representative of public opinion[179]. Another aspect of stability worth noting is the issue of the continuity of government policies. The more 'consensual' coalition systems, according to Lijphart, have, over the years ensured a far greater degree of policy consistency[180].

[179] Gallagher refers to other governments elected over different years in other countries where voter representation is much higher: Austria (1990), 74.9%, the Netherlands (1989), 67.2%; Finland (1987), 58.8%, Ireland (1992), 58.4%; and Germany (1990), 54.8%. Gallagher, Michael. 1995. "Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities." Limerick: Political Studies Association of Ireland Press. Pages 327-328; Table 12.2.
[180] Lijphart, Arend. 1984. *Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven, London, Yale University Press.

p. 73. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

While FPTP may have a good record in producing safe legislative majorities and therefore in facilitating the implementation of manifesto promises, there is a question mark over the extent to which this is a sufficient indicator of government stability. For instance, the government may be stable because it has a majority of seats, but how *representative* is it? In other words, to what extent is it stable in terms of numbers of votes? The UK government elected in 1992 had the support of just 41.9 per cent of those who voted. By contrast, other governments elected around the same time were far more representative of public opinion, e.g. Austria (1990), 74.9 per cent; the

Another aspect of 'stability' which is worth noting is the issue of continuity of government policies. The adversarial nature of British change (Finer, 1975). By contrast, the more 'consensual' nature of coalitional systems – due to the need to strike deals between parties – ensures a far greater degree of policy consistency over time (Lijphart, 1984).

governments elected around the same time were far more representative of public opinion, e.g. Austria (1990), 74.9 per cent; the Netherlands (1989), 67.2 per cent; Finland (1987), 58.8 per cent; Ireland (1992), 58.4 per cent; and Germany (1990), 54.8 per cent.

Farrell, 1997, p. 156

Bowler and Grofman, in their analysis on the Maltese electoral system, refer to the arguments brought by the Nationalist government for reform over the past few years. Worth noting is their statement that "…its proclaimed dual aim was to ensure both proportionality and 'governability'. There was no acknowledgement that both goals are not necessarily compatible…"[181]

[181] Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. *STV's Place in the Family of Electoral Systems.* United States of America: University of Michigan Press. Page 112

p. 73. The quote was modified without indication, and wrongly attributed to the authors of the compilation (Bowler and Grofman.)

The reform proposals of the past few years were vigorously promoted by the Nationalist government. Its proclaimed dual aim was to ensure both proportionality and "governability" (the latter meaning one-party control of government) without acknowledgment that both goals are not necessarily compatible. The proposed remedies involved a variety of procedural approaches,

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 201

It is increasingly argued today, that PR systems ensure the easier entry of small and extremist parties into parliament, threatening the stability of the government, particularly in those cases where the extremists hold the balance of power in the parliament. Extremist parties in the parliament not only increases the risk of hung parliaments, with governments being hostage to the unpopular policies which extremist politicians seek to promote, but it also affects the stability of the political system by giving undue representation to politicians and parties whose views are objectionable to the majority of the citizens.

However, much empirical evidence portrays how extremist parties can also achieve prominence in non-PR systems, in particular where they can take advantage of a geographical concentration in their support base[182]. Indeed, one

[182] One may refer to for example Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the *Front Nationale,* in France where a majoritarian system reigns.

p. 74

3 PR systems ensure the easy entry of small and extremist parties into parliament, threatening the stability of the government, particularly in those cases where the extremists hold the balance of power in the parliament.

parliament, these systems facilitate the rise of extremist parties. This not only increases the risk of hung parliaments, with governments being hostage to the vagaries of extremist politicians, but it also affects the stability of the political system by giving undue representation to politicians and parties whose views are abhorrent to the majority of citizens.

systems? Extremist parties can also achieve prominence in non-proportional systems, in particular wherever they can take advantage of a geographical concentration in their support base. As we see in

systems; the sixth case is France, where Jean Marie Le Pen and his National Front have made shock waves in a majoritarian-based system. The other point worth remarking on in Table 7.4 is the lack

Farrell, 1997, pp. 154, 156-157

proportional electoral systems, there therefore is, according to Farrell, a lack of any apparent relationship between the degree of the proportionality of the electoral system and the electoral success of extreme right parties.

However, proportional systems can make life easier for extremist politicians and parties. One could always say that in a democracy all views and opinions should have equal rights of expression and so parties should be facilitated not blocked. One could even argue that by allowing extremists into the parliament, the electoral system might be playing a moderating role encouraging such parties to work within the system.

But if the objective is to try to prevent extremist parties and politicians from being elected, then what can proportional systems do to meet it? According to legal critics the legal threshold of compulsory vote percentages imposed by systems such as the German one[184], are no guarantee and that non-proportional systems provide a simpler means of achieving the same result. This besides the argument that such legal restrictions operate against the principle of proportionality.

p. 75. The footnote does not refer to any source. Although Farrell is mentioned at the beginning of the depicted passage of text, a corresponding footnote is missing. The copying continues without any further reference.

system. The other point worth remarking on in Table 7.4 is the lack of any apparent relationship between the degree of proportionality of the electoral system (as shown by the PR ranking) and the relative success of extreme right parties.

There is little doubt, however, that proportional systems can make life easier for extremist politicians and parties. One could always develop a defence of PR along the lines that, in a democracy, all views and opinions should have equal rights of expression and that, morally therefore, such parties should be facilitated, not blocked. One could even make the argument that, by allowing extremists into the parliament, the electoral system might be playing a moderating role, encouraging such parties to work within the system, rather than

If the objective is to try to prevent extremist parties and politicians from being elected, then what can proportional systems do to meet it?

At this point, the critic of proportional electoral systems might raise the following set of objections: these legal blocks on parties are hardly cast-iron guarantees against the danger of extremists 'breaking through'; non-proportional systems provide a more effective, and simpler, means of achieving the same result; and, in any event, operating such legal restrictions is somewhat against the principle of proportionality and is, therefore, contradictory. Each of these points

Farrell, 1997, pp. 157-158

In sum, I am inclined to argue that the evidence of a trade-off between the proportionality of an electoral system and measures of governmental or system stability is absent. For while it is true that proportional electoral systems are associated with greater degrees of stability, as Lijphart concludes, "the conventional wisdom is wrong in positing a trade-off between the advantages of plurality and PR systems. The superior performance of PR with regard to political representation is not counterbalanced by an inferior record on governmental effectiveness. The practical conclusion is that PR is to be preferred over plurality since it offers both better representation and at least as effective public policy-making"[185].

[185] Arend Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press. Page 8.

p. 76. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source. Part of the quote by Lijphart was omitted without indication.

In sum, the evidence of a trade-off between the proportionality of an electoral system and measures of governmental or system stability is, for the most part, conspicuous by its absence. On the contrary, it anything, proportional electoral systems are associated with greater degrees of stability. Indeed, in his comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of democracy, Arend Lijphart concludes (1994a: 8):

the conventional wisdom is wrong in positing a trade-off between the advantages of plurality and PR systems. The superior performance of PR with regard to political representation is not counterbalanced by an inferior record on governmental effectiveness; if anything, the record of the PR countries on macro-economic management appears to be a bit better than that of the plurality systems – but not to the extent that the differences are statistically significant. The practical conclusion is that PR is to be preferred over plurality since it offers both better representation and at least as effective public policy-making.

Farrell, 1997, pp. 160-161

This thesis is seeking to address representative democracy not just as a process but also as an outcome. Although questions of proportionality and the number of parties in the system are essential components of the outcome of a democratic election, this may say little about how such outcomes are achieved. The last

p. 77

More importantly, the questions raised in this volume address representative democracy not just as an outcome but as a process. Although questions of proportionality are inevitably tied to the issue of whether an outcome of a democratic election is fair or not, this may say little about how such outcomes are achieved. Yet the collection of essays in this volume has shown that there are a

Bowler, Grofman, 2000 (Conclusion), p. 270

Dieter Nohlen, tends to express his scepticism at the possibility of classifying the variables which influence electoral outcomes. He refers to the fact that "path-dependencies might mitigate against expected effects of electoral systems; and socio-, political-, cultural- and economic conditions may condition outcomes in significant ways"[186]. According to him, even in carefully designed cross-national studies, direction of causality is often difficult to establish[187].

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[186] Dieter Nohlen, "Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America", in Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman (eds) *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Boulder C. O: Westview Press. Page 45.

[187] Joe Foweraker and Todd Landmann. 2002. "Constitutional Design and Democratic Performance", in *Democratisation*. Issue 9(2). Pages 43-66.

p. 77. The first part is wrongly indicated as Nohlen's quote (while it is not in quotation marks in Lindberg, 2005), and the second sentence is also incorrectly attributed to Nohlen in opposition to the message in Lindberg's work.

outcomes; path-dependencies might mitigate against expected effects of electoral systems; and socio, political, cultural, and economic conditions may condition outcomes in significant ways (Nohlen, 1996, p. 45). Even in carefully designed cross-national studies, direction of causality is often difficult to establish (e.g. Foweraker and Landmann, 2002). Even so, the extension of the law-like consequences of

Lindberg, 2005, p.43

proportionality[190]. Lijphart defines the district magnitude "as the number of representatives elected in a district (constituency)"[191]. Douglas W. Rae's 1967 study *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* is better known as the first systematic comparative analysis of the effects of electoral systems on disproportionality and multipartism and the identification of the extremely strong influence of district magnitude[192]. Rae refers to James Hogan as the first scholar who coined this term in 1945 who wrote, "the decisive point in PR is the size [magnitude] of the constituencies: the larger the constituency, that is, the greater the number of members which it elects, the more closely will the result approximate to proportionality"[193]. And, earlier still, George Horwill in 1925 had already referred to district magnitude as the "all important factor"[194].

[192] Douglas W. Rae, 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Pages 114-125. Revised and enlarged edition published in 1971.
[193] James Hogan. 1945. *Election and Representation*. Cork: Cork University Press. Page 13

pp. 78-79. Lijphart is only cited at the beginning of the text passage. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

District magnitude is defined as the number of representatives elected in a district (constituency). One of the best-known findings of Douglas W. Rae's 1967 study *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*—the first systematic comparative analysis of the effects of electoral systems on disproportionality and multipartism, which has been a major source of inspiration for this book—was the extremely strong influence of district magnitude.[2] Rae modestly attributes this proposition to James Hogan who wrote in 1945: 'the decisive point in P.R. is the size [magnitude] of the constituencies: the larger the constituency, that is, the greater the number of members which it elects, the more closely will the result approximate to proportionality.'[3] And twenty years earlier, George Horwill had already referred to district magnitude as 'the all-important factor'.[4]

2. Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), 114–25. All future references to Rae's book will be to its revised and enlarged edition published in 1971.
3. James Hogan, *Election and Representation* (Cork: Cork University Press, 1945), 13.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 10-11, 179

In PR systems, proportionality – and the chances for small parties to gain representation – are necessarily very limited when there are only two or three representatives per district. In contrast, in countries with multi-member districts, district magnitude tends to vary – so authors, such as Lijphart, refer to the *average* district magnitude.

p. 79. Lijphart is mentioned without any footnote. Since the text is almost a word-for-word copy, it would have been necessary to cite in quotation marks.

In PR systems, proportionality—and the chances for small parties to gain representation—are necessarily very limited when there are only two or three representatives per district, but increase dramatically when magnitude increases. In countries with multi-member districts, district magnitude tends to vary; in this study, therefore, magnitude will usually refer to the *average* district magnitude. It can be calculated very simply by dividing the total number

Lijphart, 1994, p. 11

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[194] George Horwill. 1925. *Proportional Representation: Its Dangers and Defects*. London: Allen and Unwin. Page 53. Taagepera and Shugart also make reference to the importance of district magnitude by calling it the '*decisive factor*' in their *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Page 112

pp. 79-80

4. George Horwill, *Proportional Representation: Its Dangers and Defects* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1925), 53. In language strikingly similar to Hogan's and Horwill's, Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart re-emphasize the importance of district magnitude by calling it 'the decisive factor' in their *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 112.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 179

The discussion of the effect of the electoral formula and the district size it contemplates, on proportionality, has led to a more in-depth analysis of their effect on disproportionality and multipartism. An examination of Rae and Lijphart's arguments on the relationship between the variables, thus become relevant.

p. 81. The way Lijphart is mentioned at the end of the paragraph does not imply that the preceding sentence is taken from this source.

The discussion of the effect of the electoral formula and district magnitude on proportionality has paved the way for a more expeditious treatment of their effect on multipartism. The reason is that pro-

Lijphart, 1990, p. 488

Rae reports a monotonic relationship between magnitude and the number of parties for the PR systems – from 3.18 parties in the lowest category of magnitude to 4.65 parties in the highest[199]. Lijphart finds however, that his findings on the

[199] Rae, Douglas. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 121.

p. 81. Adoption of literature reference. Lijphart is mentioned in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

as Rae (p. 121) suggests. Rae reports a monotonic relationship between magnitude and the number of parties for the PR systems—from 3.18 parties in the lowest category of magnitude to 4.65 parties in the highest, an increase of approximately

Lijphart, 1990, pp. 490-491

In addition to the macro-level effects of electoral systems, which in some part are all related to the issue of their proportionality profiles, in recent years there has been increasing attention to the micro-level effects of electoral systems, in terms of both how voters use them and how parties are affected by them. Here, the attention is less on the question of proportionality and its consequences, and more on the issue of the mechanics of the vote, which is affected mainly by ballot structure. Thus, the strategic effects of electoral systems come into play.

Lijphart has recently found some evidence that ballot structure might be influential. This variable was also given recognition in Rae's work as one of the

p. 82

In addition to the macro-level effects of electoral systems, which in some part are all related to the issue of their proportionality profiles, in recent years there has been increasing attention to the micro-level effects of electoral system, in terms of both how voters use them (e.g. strategic and split-ticket voting) and how parties are affected by them (e.g. variations in campaign style). Here, the attention is less on the question of proportionality (for the most part affected by district magnitude and electoral formula) and its consequences, and more on the issue of the mechanics of the vote, which, is affected mainly by ballot structure. These micro-level effects of electoral systems are considered in section 7.5. The chapter closes

little disagreement with these general conclusions, although Lijphart (1994) has recently found some evidence that ballot structure might be influential. Lijphart also adds other factors to the list of influences

Farrell, 1997, pp. 142-144

Consequently one can argue that since preferential electoral systems provide very large scope for voters to express their preferences in many ways, strategic and tactical voting becomes increasingly evident[208]. Voters can switch and change between one candidate and another at will, and in STV between one party and another. For instance, there is plenty of evidence from the Irish case over the years that voters have made use of their vote transfers strategically, for instance to influence the possible formation of a coalition government. This however is not

[208] Bowler, Shaun. 1996. "Reasoning Voters, Voter Behaviour and Institutions: The Decision Dependence of Voting Behaviour." In *British Elections and Parties Yearbook*, edited by David Farrell, David Broughton, David Denver, and Justin Fisher. London: Frank Cass.

pp. 83-84. Adoption of the literature reference. Farrell, 1997, is only cited in the preceding paragraphs.

the systems discussed so far. What is unique about preferential electoral systems – such as the alternative vote, STV and certain types of open list system – is that they provide such large scope for voters to express more complex and nuanced preferences. Voters can switch and change between one candidate and another at will (and, in STV, between one party and another). There is plenty of scope to voters to act strategically (Bowler, 1996; Bowler and Farrell, 1996). As we saw in chapter 6, there is plenty of evidence from the Irish case over the years that voters have made use of their vote transfers strategically, for instance, to influence the possible formation of a coalition government (see pp. 124–26).

Farrell, 1997, p. 164

The image at the top is the logo header.

For example one can refer to the complete unwillingness of Maltese voters, to vote on other than a strict party basis[209]. They generally express preferences for the candidates of their favoured party, and then stop. Irish voters are more likely to give lower preferences to another party's candidates after voting for their own. Example, at the 1997 Irish election, Fianna Fáil's internal transfer solidarity was only 68%, and Fine Gael's was 64%. A statistical analysis of this 'party

[209] Hirczy de Miño, Wlolfgang and John C. Lane. "Malta: STV in a Two-Party System". In Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman. 2000. *Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press. Pages 178-204.

p. 84. The footnote refers to chapter 9 of the compilation (see reference on the right) which does not contain the relevant text. Therefore, the reference has only been copied without mentioning the original source.

being party systemic. It refers to the willingness of voters in Ireland, and the complete unwillingness of their Maltese counterparts, to vote on other than a strict party basis. Maltese voters express preferences for the candidates of their favored party, and then stop (see chapter 9). Irish voters, however, are more likely to give lower preferences to another party's candidates after voting for their own or, indeed, not to vote on a party basis in the first place; for

Gael candidate from the same area. At the 1997 Irish election, Fianna Fáil's internal transfer solidarity was only 68 percent, and Fine Gael's was 64 percent (Gallagher 1999, 138–39).

Gallagher, 2000, pp. 89-90

only 68%, and Fine Gael's was 64%. A statistical analysis of this 'party solidarity'[210], in vote transfer patterns shows that the percentage of cross party voting is about 1% on ballots where the preference in the preceding round was for an MLP or a PN candidate. In an letter to the editor in a recent edition of the daily

[210] The terms 'party solidarity' and 'party exclusivity' were introduced in 1978 by Michael Gallagher in 'Party Solidarity, Exclusivity and Inter-Party Relationships in Ireland, 1922-1977: The Evidence of Transfers,' *Economic and Social Review* Issue 10. Pages 1-22.

p. 84. Adoption of literature reference.

A statistical analysis of what Michael Gallagher (1978) has termed "party solidarity" in vote transfer patterns shows that the percentage of cross-party transfers is about 1 percent on ballots where the preference in the preceding round was for an MLP or a PN candidate.[6] The number of such defections

6. The terms "party solidarity" and "party exclusivity" were introduced by Michael Gallagher in "Party Solidarity, Exclusivity and Inter-Party Relationships in Ireland, 1922–1977: The Evidence of Transfers." *Economic and Social Review* 10 (1978): 1–22.

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, pp. 192, 204

Douglas Rae in the 1960s concluded that electoral formula has an effect on proportionality, district magnitude has an even greater effect while ballot structure has no effect. He hypothesised that ordinal ballots may encourage multipartism,

p. 85

Douglas Rae in the 1960s produced the following findings: electoral formula has an effect on proportionality, district magnitude has an even greater effect and ballot structure has no effect. There has been

Farrell, 1997, p. 144

because they allow the dispersion of votes. Thus, based on the distinction between ordinal and categorical ballots, Rae argued that ordinal ballots "allow each voter's mandate to be dispersed among several parties, thereby producing a sort of microfractionalisation". Hence, elections held with such ballots, "produce more fractionalised elective party systems than would be found under other elections".

p. 85. Adjustment of the original quote without indication.

structure on multipartism, Rae formulates his most original hypothesis. Based on the distinction between ordinal ballots, which "allow the voter to favor more than one party with his mandate," and categorical ballots, which "require that the voter give his mandate to a single party," Rae (p. 126) hypothesizes that ordinal ballots "allow each voter's mandate to be dispersed among several parties, thereby producing a sort of microfractionalization" and that elections held with such ballots, and hence with repeated microfractionalizations, "produce more fractionalized elective party systems than would be found under other elections."

Lijphart, 1990, p. 491

analyses of elections in twenty countries from 1945 to 1964[215]. He changes the argument to say that the relationship goes the opposite way because in his study, ordinal systems have an average effective number of only 2.94 parties compared to 3.23 parties in categorical systems.

p. 86. The footnote does not refer to Lijphart, 1990.

However, he finds that the relationship is the other way around: his ordinal systems have an average effective number of only 2.94 parties compared with 3.23 parties in categorical systems. His conclusion is,

Lijphart, 1990, p. 491

politicians threaten democracy. As a result, it is common for PR systems to include legal or minimum electoral thresholds[218] that is, a minimum level of support which a party needs in order to gain representation and thus be granted any seats in the parliament. If the electoral law provides for such a threshold, it is usually applied at the national level, but, as Lijphart affirms, it may also be

p. 87. The footnote does not refer to the source. Lijphart is mentioned without any footnote, and the wording ("but, as Lijphart affirms") indicates that only the following, but not the preceding contents are taken from this source.

Another important dimension of electoral systems is the electoral threshold, that is, a minimum level of support which a party needs in order to gain representation. If the electoral law provides for such a threshold, it is usually applied at the national level (indi-

Lijphart, 1994, p. 11

seats in the higher-level district. After the unstable experiences of PR under the German Weimar Republic from 1919 to 1933 where governments were for many years stalled to policies promoted by the minor parties, the election to the Bundestag now dictates that a party must win either 5% of the vote or three constituency seats in order to pass the electoral threshold.

p. 87

in Germany. After the unstable experiences of PR under the Weimar Republic (1919–33) where successive governments were held hostage to the vagaries of minor parties, the German system operates a rule that a party must win either 5 per cent of the vote or three constituency seats in order to pass the electoral threshold (for further

Farrell, 1997, p. 10

Most electoral systems do not have such legal thresholds, but according to a number of scholars such as Taagepera and Shugart, the district magnitude can implicitly place a legal threshold. This because low magnitudes have the same effect as high thresholds as both limit proportionality and the opportunities for small parties to win seats; and vice versa as magnitudes increase and thresholds decrease[219]. Thus, although a system might not contemplate a legal threshold, an

p. 87. The footnote does not refer to any source.

Not all electoral systems have such legal thresholds—in fact, most do not—but, as Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart have pointed out, even in the absence of an explicit legal threshold, an actual threshold is implied by the other two dimensions of the electoral system, especially by district magnitude.[6] Low magnitudes have the same effect as high thresholds: both limit proportionality and the opportunities for small parties to win seats; as magnitudes increase and thresholds decrease, proportionality and the chances

Lijphart, 1994, p. 12

Lijphart in fact treats effective thresholds and district magnitude as one key variable of an electoral system which have a significant effect on the electoral outcome. In other words, the effective threshold draws on the district magnitude and legal threshold in the calculation of the average percentage which a party needs to win a seat. Georg Lutz sums it up in the following equation

p. 87. Lutz is mentioned, without any footnote, at the end of the paragraph, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

empirical work therefore have already used the (average) district magnitude as the key variable to describe an electoral system (Rae 1967). The weakness of this approach is, that legal threshold can not be included in this measure. Therefore the concept has been widened e.g. by Lijphart (1994) by using the "effective threshold" as a key variable of an electoral system. This variable draws on the district magnitude and legal threshold, if they exist and describe the average percentage a party needs to get a seat (for further desciption see later in

Lutz, 2001, p. 4

In addition to this problem of determining the exact threshold between the lower and upper ranges of percentages, one must focus on the fact that thresholds are largely influenced by, as was seen in the former chapters, electoral formulae and the number of political parties competing in a general election. Furthermore, the number of parties and the district magnitude generally show a degree of variance from one district to another. In order to solve these problems, Taagepera and Shugart suggest that the number of parties be approximated with the district magnitude, that the average magnitude for the electoral system as a whole be used and that the effective threshold be assumed to be half-way between the upper and lower thresholds. Lijphart calculates the effective threshold by computing the larger of the value from the average magnitude and the legal threshold.[220]

p. 88. Lijphart is only cited at the end of the paragraph, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied. The footnote does not refer to any source.

In addition to the problem of determining the exact threshold in the range between the upper and lower thresholds, there are two additional problems. One is that, while these thresholds are largely determined by the district magnitude, they are also influenced to some extent by the electoral formula and the number of political parties that compete. Second, both the magnitude and the number of parties may vary considerably from district to district.

In order to deal with these problems, I shall follow Taagepera and Shugart's lead, although my final solution will be slightly different from theirs.[24] They suggest a series of useful and reasonable approximations: that the number of parties be assumed to be about the same as the district magnitude, that the average magnitude for the system as a whole be used, that the formulas also be roughly averaged, and, most importantly, that the effective threshold be assumed to be half-way between the upper and the lower thresholds. Under the first of these assumptions, the upper threshold is

Lijphart, 1994, p. 26

Lijphart also adds the size of the assembly, or total seats in the legislature, to the list of influences on proportionality. Rae refers to this variable as a "generally neglected one"[221] but he does not enter it into his 1967 analysis. However it would seem that its importance was recognised as a brief discussion of the consequences of assembly size is found in a new chapter which he added to the 1967 edition of the book. Lijphart opines that the reason why other authors have also neglected it

[221] Douglas W. Rae. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Page 158

p. 89. Lijphart is mentioned before and after the depicted passage of text, but the part referring to Rae, including the footnote, has been copied as well.

Rae calls attention to this 'generally neglected variable', but he does not enter it into his empirical analysis.[7] Its effect has not been

7. Rae, *Political Consequences*, 158. His brief discussion of the consequences of assembly size occurs in a new chapter that he added to the first (1967) edition of his book.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 12, 179

perfect degree. According to Rein Taagepera, the same theory can be applied even to non-PR systems even though these systems do not aim at proportionality. He has found out that, in plurality elections, the degree of disproportionality does tend to increase as the size of the legislature decreases[224]. He arrives to this conclusion by expounding on what he terms, the 'cube law of elections'. This law holds that if, in two party systems and plurality single-member district elections, the votes received by the two parties are divided in a ratio *a* : *b*, the seats they will win will be in the ratio of a^3 : b^3. Taagepera shows that the exponent of 3 applies only under special circumstances, and it increases as the number of voters increases and/or the assembly size decreases. In a later work, Lijphart and Jorge Heine prove

[224] Rein Taagepera. 1973. 'Seats and Votes: A Generalization of the Cube Law of Elections', *Social Science Research*, Issue 2, Pages 257-75.

pp. 89-90. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

principle, for a 100-member legislative body. Of course, the same pattern theoretically applies to non-PR systems as well, but since these systems do not even aim at proportionality, the hypothesis Taagepera has found that, in plurality elections, the degree of disproportionality does tend to increase, all other factors being equal, as the size of the legislature decreases.[8] In short, there is

8. Rein Taagepera, 'Seats and Votes: A Generalization of the Cube Law of Elections', *Social Science Research*, 2 (1973), 257–75; see also Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats and Votes*, 156–72. The cube law holds that if, in two-party systems and plurality single-member district elections, the votes received by the two parties are divided in a ratio of *a* : *b*, the seats that they win will be in the ratio of a^3 : b^3. Taagepera shows that the exponent of 3 applies only under special circumstances, and that it goes up—and hence also that disproportionality increases—as the number of voters increases and/or assembly size decreases.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 13, 179

Shugart shows how presidential systems can have an important effect on legislative elections, if presidential elections are by plurality and if legislative elections are held at the same time[226]. Large parties have an advantage in presidential races since smaller parties do not have such a big chance to have one of their candidates elected, and this advantage, according to Lijphart[227], "tends to

[226] Matthew S. Shugart. 1988. *Duverger's Rule, District Magnitude, and Presidentialism.* Ph. D. diss., University of California, Irvine. Pages 17-29, 116-119. See also John M. Carey. 1996. *Term Limits and Legislative Representation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

p. 90. Adoption of literature reference Lijphart is only cited at the end of the depicted passage, in a way that suggests only the following text has been copied.

Third, Shugart has shown that presidential systems can have an important effect on legislative elections if presidential elections are by plurality and if legislative elections are held at the same time: large parties have an advantage in presidential races since smaller parties do not have much of a chance to have one of their candidates elected, and this advantage tends to carry over into the legislative elections.[12] Hence, presidentialism tends to discour-

12. Matthew S. Shugart, 'Duverger's Rule, District Magnitude, and Presidentialism' (Ph. D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 1988), 17–29, 116–19.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 15, 180

of their candidates elected, and this advantage, according to Lijphart[227], "tends to carry over into the legislative elections". Hence presidential systems could be seen to discourage multipartism and thus presidential systems will have smaller effective numbers of parties than non-presidential systems of government. One generally accepted reasoning for this is the impact of presidential systems[228]. As

[228] This however can only be said for the American two-party system which is a much more exclusive two-party system , because there are virtually no third parties than the British, Canadian and New Zealand teo-party systems.

pp. 90-91. Further copying of text after the source has been cited under quotation marks.

expect that presidential systems, all other factors being equal, will have smaller effective numbers of parties than non-presidential systems of government. One generally accepted explanation of the American two-party system—which is a much more exclusive two-party system, with virtually no third parties at all, than the British, Canadian, and New Zealand two-party systems—is the impact of presidential elections. In Latin America, the same mech-

Lijphart, 1994, p. 131

generally accepted reasoning for this is the impact of presidential systems[228]. As Shugart and Carey point out, this is especially the case when the presidential election is decided by plurality rather than majority, as a run-off election may be required and, even more importantly, when the legislative election is held at the same time as the presidential elections, as in Costa Rica.

p. 91

conducted under PR. As Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey have pointed out, this is especially the case when the presidential election is decided by plurality rather than by majority (which may require a run-off election) and, more importantly, when the legislative election is held at the same time as the presidential election, as in Costa Rica.[7] Indirectly, by limiting the number of

Lijphart, 1994, p. 131

they are not elected by plurality. This, says Duverger, is what has taken place in France where, under a two-ballot system for both presidential and legislative elections, a multi-party system has been maintained but in a two-bloc or bipolar format and with considerably fewer parties than in the parliamentary Third Republic which used the same electoral system[230].

[230] Maurice Duverger. 1986. 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), *Electoral Laws and their Political* Consequences. New York: Agathon Press. Pages 81-82.

p. 91. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

they are not elected by plurality. In France, for instance, under a two-ballot system for both presidential and legislative elections, a multi-party system has been maintained but in a two-bloc or bipolar format and with considerably fewer parties than in the parliamentary Third Republic which used the same electoral system. Maurice Duverger asks 'why the same electoral system coincided with a dozen parties in the Third Republic but ended up with only four in the Fifth Republic'. His main explanation is 'the direct popular election of the president, which has transformed the political regime'.[8] Similarly, it may be hypothesized that pressures

8. Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), 81–2.

Lijphart, 1994, p. 133, 190

elections[232]. This thus means that the combined total of votes received by all the parties, will be used to allocate initial legislative seats. This is usually referred to by the French term *apparentement*[233]. According to Andrew McLaren Carstairs, whether *apparentement* is permitted or otherwise, is of great importance to the degree of success of smaller parties, since almost all electoral systems favour large parties[234]. Thus, as Enid Lakeman argues, *apparentement* makes it possible for

[232] It was also used in Sweden in 1948, in Norway in 1945 and 1985 and in France in 1951 and 1956 where it was a central part of the mixed PR-majority system.
[233] Termed 'cartel' by Martin Harrop and William L. Miller. 1987. *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction*. London: Macmillan. Page 66; and 'association' by Robert A. Newland. 1982. *Comparative Electoral Systems* .London: Arthur McDougall Fund. Page 57.
[234] Andrew McLaren Carstairs. 1980. *A short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe*. London: Allen and Unwin. Page 23.

p. 93. Adoption of literature references. Lijphart is only mentioned, without any footnote, at the beginning and end of the paragraph.

their lists, which means that their combined vote total will be used in the initial allocation of seats. A set of such inter-party connected lists is usually referred to by the French term *apparentement*. As Andrew McLaren Carstairs has pointed out, since almost all electoral systems, including PR, in practice favour the larger parties to some extent, 'the question of whether or not *apparentement* is permitted can be of great importance to the smaller parties'.[13]

that have been proposed include 'cartel'[9] and 'association',[10] but *apparentement* is the most commonly used term in English, too.

the Danish Euro-elections, but it was also used in Sweden in 1948 and in Norway in 1945 and 1985.[12] (As discussed in Chapter 2, it was also an integral part of the mixed PR–majority system in France in 1951 and 1956, which is left out of consideration in the current

9. Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1987), 66.
10. Robert A. Newland, *Comparative Electoral Systems* (London: Arthur McDougall Fund, 1982), 57.
13. Andrew McLaren Carstairs, *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), 23.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 15, 134, 190, 180

Apparentement thus joins the other important influences on disproportionality and the party systems within the structure that it is utilised.

p. 94. Lijphart is only mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Apparentement therefore joins ballot structure and presidentialism as important influences on disproportionality and/or the party system that have been discovered in this chapter. It is espe-

Lijphart, 1994, p. 138

The best a proportional electoral system can hope to achieve is to minimise the degree of distortion. Distorting effects can be 'natural' however, they can also result from the manipulation by electoral engineers who implement 'artificial' measures in order to direct the distorting effects in their favour. Farrell refers to gerrymandering, malapportionment, and party laws as three such examples[235].

p. 94. Farrell, 1997 is mentioned at the end of the paragraph, in a way that suggests only the following text has been copied from this source. Moreover, there is only the superscript no. 235 in the body text. A corresponding footnote text at the end of the page is missing.

others. The best a proportional electoral system can hope to achieve is to minimize the degree of distortion.

Quite apart from the 'natural' distorting effects of electoral systems (which are the subject of chapter 7), there are instances where electoral engineers resort to added 'artificial' measures, seeking to direct the distorting effects in their favour. There are four such

Farrell, 1997, pp. 7-8

III. 1.   GERRYMANDERING

This refers to the practice in which constituency boundaries are redrawn with the intention of increasing the number of seats for a party, usually the governing party. This can be done either by dividing a party's supporters into smaller geographical parts across a range of constituencies to ensure that they are kept in a minority in each of the constituencies formed, or, if the party is too large to allow such a method to work, the number of seats it can win may be decreased by designing the constituency boundaries in such a way that where the governing party's vote is high, it stands to win a lot of seats and where it is low it stand to lose a few seats. In most cases, gerrymandering occurs in non-proportional electoral systems which have single member constituencies. However, in the case of the STV electoral system which is characterized by multi-member constituencies, this has also been

[236] Mair, Peter. 1986. "Districting Choices under the Single Transferable Vote." In *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon.

pp. 94-95. Adoption of literature reference. Although it is mentioned before that "Farrell refers to gerrymandering, malapportionment, and party laws" (see fragment above), the extent of subsequent copying without any further reference to Farrell is not justified.

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toral systems is *gerrymandering*. This refers to the practice in which constituency boundaries are redrawn with the intention of producing an inflated number of seats for a party, usually the governing party. There are two ways of achieving this. The first method is to divide one party's supporters into smaller pockets across a range of constituencies to ensure that they are kept in a permanent minority in each of the constituencies formed, thereby preventing this party from winning any seats. Wherever the party is too large to allow such a method to work, an alternative tack is to try to minimize the number of seats it can win by designing the constituency boundaries in such a way that where the governing party's vote is high it stands to win a lot of seats and where it is low it stands to lose a few seats.

Gerrymandering is generally associated with non-proportional electoral systems which have single-member constituencies. However, there are instances of its use in proportional systems, particularly in the case of the STV electoral system which is characterized by multi-member constituencies (Mair, 1986). The most notorious

Farrell, 1997, pp. 8-9

said to happen[236]. One can refer to for instance the outcome of the 1981 election, when the PN won an overall majority of votes yet the MLP won an overall majority of seats. This was due to the way the constituency boundaries had been drawn by the MLP government, an arrangement the PN alleged had been a gerrymander. The PN boycotted parliament in consequence.

p. 95. The footnote does not refer to Gallagher, 2000 (see fragment above).

a result of the outcome of the 1981 election, when the PN won an overall majority of votes (50.9 percent) yet the MLP won a majority of the seats (34 out of 65). This was due to the way the constituency boundaries had been drawn by the MLP government, an arrangement the PN alleged had been a gerrymander. The PN boycotted Parliament in consequence. A new rule was then

Gallagher, 2000, p. 88

In his recent analyses of the proportional or disproportional effects of electoral systems, Michael Gallagher cautions his readers and academic counterparts that other dimensions of electoral systems may affect the degree of proportionality of election outcomes[237]. He refers to so-called malapportionment, which refers to a

[237] This in addition to district magnitude and thresholds – unlike Lijphart, Gallagher does not mention the factor of assembly size.

p. 95

Second, in his recent analysis of the proportional or disproportional effects of different electoral formulas, Michael Gallagher rightly warns his readers that other dimensions of electoral systems may also affect the degree of proportionality of election outcomes: in addition to district magnitude and thresholds (he does not mention the factor of assembly size), he points to 'the possibility

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 14-15

election outcomes[237]. He refers to so-called malapportionment, which refers to a situation in which there are imbalances in the population densities of constituencies which favour some parties over others, and thus contribute to

p. 95. "He" does not refer to Farrell but to Gallagher (see fragment above).

First, there is the practice of *malapportionment.* This refers to a situation in which there are imbalances in the population densities of constituencies which favour some parties over others. This can

Farrell, 1997, p. 8

Malapportionment can happen naturally, by population shifts not being compensated for by a redrawing of constituency boundaries, but it can also be engineered on purpose. In single-member district systems, malapportionment

p. 95

constituencies which favour some parties over others. This can happen as a matter of course, by population shifts not being compensated for by a redrawing of constituency boundaries, but it can also be engineered on purpose. Take, for example, the case of a governing

Farrell, 1997, p. 8

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engineered on purpose. In single-member district systems, malapportionment occurs where districts have significantly unequal voting populations. Contrastingly, malapportioned multi-member districts have magnitudes that do not correspond with their voting populations. Lijphart says how malapportionment

pp. 95-96. Lijphart is mentioned after two sentences, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

of malapportionment'.[11] In single-member district systems, malapportionment means that the districts have substantially unequal voting populations; malapportioned multi-member districts have magnitudes that are not commensurate with their voting populations. Obviously, malapportionment may systematically

Lijphart, 1994, p. 15

The extension of law-like consequences of electoral systems first conceived by Duverger[243] and Downs[244] have been testified by the work of scholars like Bogdanor and Butler[245], Lijphart and Waisman[246], Mair[247], Powell[248], Reynolds and Sisk[249], and Sartori[250]. Lijphart's recent studies, in particular, have added

[243] Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.
[244] Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper Collins.
[245] Bogdanor, Vernon and David Butler (eds.) 1983. *Democracy and Elections.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[246] Lijphart, Arend and Carlos H. Waisman. 1996. "Institutional Design and Democratisation." In Arend Lijphart abd Carlos H. Waisman (eds) *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America.* Boulder C. O.: Westview Press.
[247] Mair, Peter (ed.) 1990. *The West European Party System.* Oxford: Oxford University Press
[248] Powell, Bingham G. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy.* London: Yale University Press.
[249] Reynolds, Andrew and Timothy D. Sisk. 1998. "Elections and Electoral Systems: Implications for Conflict Management." In Sisk, Timothy D. and Andrew Reynolds (eds) *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa.* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
[250] Sartori, Giovanni. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering.* 2nd edit, New York: New York University Press

p. 97. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

and Landmann, 2002). Even so, the extension of the law-like consequences of electoral systems first developed by Duverger (1954) and Downs (1957) have been testified by the work of scholars like Bogdanor and Butler (1983), Lijphart (1984, 1994, 1999), Lijphart and Waisman (1996), Mair (1990), Powell (1982, 2000), Rae (1971), Reynolds and Sisk (1998), and Sartori (1968, 1986, 1997).

Lindberg, 2005, p.43

and Sisk[249], and Sartori[250]. Lijphart's recent studies, in particular, have added greatly to our understanding of the consequences of different electoral systems for the political system and will thus be the major focus of the arguments or contra-

p. 97

this gap. In particular, Lijphart's recent study (1994) has added greatly to our understanding of the consequences of different electoral systems for the political system, including those of both Ireland and Malta.

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, pp. 29-30

Many empirical studies on electoral systems conducted by Gallagher[252], Pennisi[253], Monroe[254], Fry and McLean[255], Cox and Shugart[256] and Lijphart[257], concluded that all systems have a more or less reductive effect on the party system, thus limiting the choice of the voters. Some voters cannot vote according to their first preference, either because their most preferred party is not running, or because their most preferred party has no chance to win a seat. This theory assumes that voters, parties and the political elite adapt to this situation in the long run. In two-party systems the parties are likely to reflect a wider political spectrum and voters will give their vote to the most preferred party with a chance to win a seat.

[252] Gallagher, Michael. 1991. "Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems", in *Electoral Studies*. Issue 10(1). Pages 33-59.
[253] Pennisi Aline. 1998. "Disproportionality Indexes and Robustness of Proportional Allocation methods", in *Electoral Studies*. Issue 17 (1). Pages 3-19.
[254] Monroe, Burt L. 1994. "Disproportionality and Malapportionment: Measuring Electoral Inequity" in *Electoral Studies* Issue 13 (2). Pages 132-149.
[255] Fry, Vanessa and McLean Iain 1991. "A Note on Rose's Proportionality Index", in *Electoral Studies*. Issue 10 (1). Pages 52-59.
[256] Cox, Gary W. and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1991. "Comment on Gallagher's 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems" in *Electoral Studies*. Issue 10 (4). Pages 348-352.
[257] Lijphart, Arend. 1984., *Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven, London, Yale University Press

p. 98. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

Others have tried to classify electoral systems empirically. All of *those* empirical studies on electoral systems agree that every electoral system has a more or less reductive effect on the party system. The reductive effect is usually measured with indexes of disproportionality. This indexes measure the differences between the votes and the seats each political party receives (an overview in Gallagher 1991 and Pennisi 1998, discussions on the various indexes in Monroe 1994, Fry and McLean 1991, Cox and Shugart 1991 and Lijphart 1994). A rather

Therefore the choice of the voters is limited. Some voters can not vote according to their first preference either because their most preferred party is not running or because their most preferred party has no chance to win a seat. The theory assumes that voters, parties and political elites adapt to this situation in the long run. In two-party systems the parties are likely to reflect a wider political spectrum and voters will give their vote to the most preferred party with a chance to win a seat.

Lutz, 2001, pp. 4, 1

This reductive effect is usually measured with degrees of proportionality. The number of parties winning legislative seats is deducted from the total number of parties competing in the elections[258]. Majoritarian systems are expected to have a strong reductive effect whereas PR systems are expected to have less. However, it is not, as Sartori argues, that PR systems have no reductive effect. The proportional design lessens the reductive effect, although it is always present to some degree[259]. Lindberg ranks the strength of the reductive effect in several

[258]Nohlen, Dieter. 1996. "Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America." In Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman (eds) *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America.* Page 49.

[259] Sartori, Giovanni. 2001. "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems" in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, *Political Parties and Democracy*, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press.

pp. 98-99. Adoption of literature references. Lindberg is only mentioned after a few sentences, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

PR with large district magnitude or pure PR. The reductive effect is measured by deducting the number of parties winning legislative seats from the total number of parties competing in the elections (Nohlen, 1996, p. 49). That measure can be Majoritarian systems are expected to have a strong reductive effect whereas PR systems (to varying degree) are expected to have less. We distinguish here between

The overall imperative of the proportional vision, is representative justice. It is not however as Sartori (2001) argues, that the PR system have *no* reductive effect. The proportional design lessens the reductive effect although it is always present somewhat. The numbers of parties competing for votes and winning legislative seats

Lindberg, 2005, pp. 47, 45

However, this measure is not without complications. First of all, countries may have more or less parties campaigning than expected, for reasons other than electoral systems. Hence the reductive effects of a particular electoral system may vary significantly in different cases. Furthermore, to measure an electoral system,

p. 99. Lindberg is only cited at the end of the paragraph, with a divergent page reference, and after a plagiarism fragment from another source (see below).

parties competing in the elections (Nohlen, 1996, p. 49). That measure can be discussed, however. First, countries may have more or less parties campaigning than expected for reasons other than electoral systems. Hence, the reductive effect of a particular electoral system may vary significantly over cases. Second, and more

Lindberg, 2005, p. 47

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vary significantly in different cases. Furthermore, to measure an electoral system, an index should give the same score under the same set of institutions. Indeed, such indexes can vary from one election to another even if the electoral system remains the same. Therefore they can only measure the disproportionality of a single election and not an electoral system as a whole. Secondly, the plurality

p. 99

Again there are difficulties with this approach. To measure an electoral system an index should give always the same score under the same set of institutions. This is not true for all the indexes of disproportionality. These indexes can vary quite a bit from one election to an other without any changes in the electoral system.[2] Therefore they can only measure the disproportionality of a single election and not an electoral system as a whole. An other

Lutz, 2001, pp. 4-5

Therefore, this measure will be applied simply to gauge the reductive effects and make the results compatible with established findings in comparative politics.

Consequent to the arguments posed above, one would expect electoral systems to indirectly affect the party system via the reductive effect.

pp. 99-100. Lindberg is only cited in the preceding paragraph.

campaign starts in almost any context. Bearing this in mind, this measure will be applied here simply to gauge the reductive effects and make the results compatible with established findings in comparative politics. A more valid measure would be to

Second, we expect electoral systems to affect the party system indirectly via the reductive effect. We expect plurality in single-member districts to be associated with

Lindberg, 2005, pp. 47, 53

According to literature on the topic, the more majoritarian the system is the lower is the level of participation. Similarly, plurality systems with their tendency to exclude peripheral voting subjects and typical competition for the median voter is assumed to lead to a lower level of voter turnout. By virtue of the possibility of multi-polar competition and lower effective thresholds, the more proportional the system, participation both by voters and marginal parties is expected to be higher.

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The more majoritarian the system the lower the level of participation, following current wisdom. A plurality system with its exclusionary logic towards peripheral voting subjects and typical competition for the median voter is assumed to lead to lower voter turnout. We may also assume that in new democracies parties that stand more multipolar the competition and lower effective thresholds typical for proportional systems the higher participation both by voters and marginal parties.

Lindberg, 2005, p. 57

IV. III. ACCOUNTABILITY

Electoral systems are expected to perform differently with regard to accountability. This aspect is considered to be one of the fundamental bases for

p. 101

3.7. Accountability

Electoral systems are also expected to perform differently with regard to accountability. The two main versions of the majoritarian vision supposedly present

Lindberg, 2005, p. 59

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accountability. This aspect is considered to be one of the fundamental bases for representative government because it provides a check on individuals, once elected, betraying the promises they made during the campaign. An accountable political system is one where both the government and the elected members of parliament are responsible to their constituents to the highest possible degree.

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Accountability is one of the bedrocks of representative Government, as it provides a check on individuals, once elected, betraying the promises they made during the campaign. An accountable political system is one where both the government and the elected members of parliament are responsible to their constituents to the highest degree possible. On the broader canvas, voters must be able to

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see

https://web.archive.org/web/20030111024636/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esa05.htm

responsibility that enhances accountability for policy options. Voters must be able to influence the shape of the government, either by altering the coalition of parties in power or by throwing out of office a single party, which has failed to deliver.

p. 101

possible. On the broader canvas, voters must be able to influence the shape of the government, either by altering the coalition of parties in power or by throwing out of office a single party, which has failed to deliver. Well-designed

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20030111024636/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esa05.htm

associated with a higher frequency of turnovers or 'shifting majorities' in the legislature.

Contrastingly, PR systems with large district magnitude or pure PR makes the holding of individual parties accountable for policy decisions much harder. Hence, electoral turnovers would be less frequent and less effective in the sense that new coalitions are formed with some parties from the new coalition and some parties from the former opposition.

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Hence, the expectation for a higher degree of electoral turnovers (shifting majorities) in the legislature. Mixed systems again are somewhere in between whereas in PR with small- to medium district magnitude, and to a greater extent, in PR with large district magnitude or pure PR, holding individual parties accountable for policy decisions is even harder. Shifting majorities are supposed to be less frequent and a collaborative pooling between the new coalitions from the old ruling coalition and former opposition. To gauge these we would need data on government performance

Lindberg, 2005, p. 59

Accountability involves far more than the mere holding of regular national elections; it also depends on the degree of geographical accountability, which is largely dependent on the size and territorial nature of districts, as well as the freedom of choice for voters to choose between candidates as opposed to parties.

p. 102. Reynolds is only cited at the end of the next paragraph.

Accountability involves far more than the mere holding of regular national elections; it also depends on the degree of geographical accountability, which is largely dependent on the size and territorial nature of districts, see Boundary Delimitation Index, as well as the freedom of choice for voters to choose between candidates as opposed to parties,

Taken from Reynolds, Reilly, 1997, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20030111024636/http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esa05.htm

This is done by evaluating the democratic quality of elections for each group of cases. Two indicators come into play here: the free and fairness of elections and whether the electoral process was peaceful or not. The identification of the former builds primarily on international and domestic monitoring election instruments. With regard to the latter, only elections where there have been no reports of elections-related violence during the campaign and election-day, are described as peaceful[266].

quality of elections will be evaluated, using here two essential indicators: the free and fairness of elections and whether the electoral process was peaceful or not. The identification of the former builds primarily on international and domestic election monitoring assessments. The application of peacefulness used here is very strict. Only elections where there have been no reports of elections-related violence during the campaign and election day are designated as peaceful.

Lindberg, 2005, p. 56

pp. 102-103. The footnote does not refer to Lindberg, 2005 who is only mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

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stable and resist change[269]. For as Dieter Nohlen emphasised, "fundamental changes are rare and arise only in extraordinary historical situations"[270]. The most fundamental change that Nohlen contemplates is the shift from plurality to PR and vice-versa. This, as results from Lijphart's study of twenty-seven countries

[270] Dieter Nohlen. 1984. "Changes and Choices in Electoral Systems", in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives.* New York: Praeger. Page 218.

as Dieter Nohlen has emphasized, 'fundamental changes are rare and arise only in extraordinary historical situations'.[56] The most fundamental change that Nohlen has in mind is the shift from plurality to PR or vice versa. Indeed, in our universe of twenty-

56. Dieter Nohlen, 'Changes and Choices in Electoral Systems', in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 218.

Lijphart, 1994, pp. 52, 186

p. 105. Adoption of literature reference Lijphart is mentioned after two sentences, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following passage of text has been copied.

shall be seen below, countries such as Italy, Japan and New Zealand seem to have radically moved away from this tradition. For electoral systems are not just a topic of the day in the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also have been prominent on the political agendas of established democracies. Also in Britain, a series of debates and controversies have taken place over the shift away from first-past-the-post elections for the European Parliament and for the new Assemblies of Scotland and Wales, as can be seen in the recurrent referral to the opinions of the Jenkins Commission in this and the

p. 105

tably, Japan, New Zealand, and Italy have recently made dramatic changes in their electoral rules. Even within the seemingly locked-in-cement first-past-Lijphart 1986). Electoral systems are not just a topic of the day in the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union but also have been prominent on the political agendas of established democracies. Most notably pushing forward the agenda of electoral reform. In Britain, even aside from general discussions of electoral reform for nationwide elections, a series of debates and controversies have taken place over the shift away from first-past-the-post elections for the European Parliament and for the new Assemblies of Scotland and Wales. The Jenkins Commission report thus promises a

Bowler, Grofman, 2000 (Introduction), p. 4

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[271] Argentina was another such country, but it was not included in Lijphart's study. France radically changed its system in 1958 and fairly extensive changes occurred in Japan in 1982.

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Nonetheless, electoral reforms do occur. Major changes took place in France in 1958 and Northern Ireland in 1973. Fairly extensive changes occurred in Japan in 1982 (upper-house elections). Since 1960,

Taagepera, Soberg Shugart, 1989, p. 5

Thus, despite attempts made by authors, including Lijphart[281], Taagepera and Shugart[282], and Sartori[283], to offer advice to electoral reformers on specific attributes of electoral systems, as shall be seen below, one is inclined to concur with Pippa Norris's remarks that "electoral systems are rarely designed, they are born kicking and screaming into the world out of a messy, incremental compromise between contending factions battling for survival, determined by power politics"[284].

[281] Arend, Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press.
[282] Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
[283] Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[284] Norris, Pippa. 2003. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour*, Cambridge University Press, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Page 4.

p. 110. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

actors. Despite the best efforts of learned electoral system specialists to offer kindly words of advice to 'electoral engineers' on specific features of existing electoral systems that might warrant incorporation (Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Sartori, 1995), it is difficult to disagree with Pippa Norris's (1995a: 4) observation that 'electoral systems are rarely designed, they are born kicking and screaming into the world out of a messy, incremental compromise between contending factions battling for survival, determined by power politics'.

Farrell, 1997, pp. 164-165

Given such strongly opposing reasons to reform just outlined, what causes countries with long-established electoral systems to opt for reform? For, until a very short while ago, the norm was in favour of keeping the existing electoral system regardless of its weaknesses, with very few exceptions. The predominant reason was defined as, "familiarity breeds stability"[285].

[285] Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts. January 1995. "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform". *International Political Science Review*. Issue 16. Page 11.

p. 110. Here, the author copied the wrong literature reference, namely Dunleavy and Margetts instead of Taagepera and Shugart.

Given the 'messy' nature of electoral reform, what causes countries with long-established electoral systems to opt for reform? Up until relatively recently, with the exceptions of countries like France or Argentina, the bias was very much in favour of keeping the existing electoral system regardless of its faults. The abiding principle was: '[f]amiliarity breeds stability' (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 218). Dunleavy and Margetts (1995: 11) suggest that such a view

Farrell, 1997, p. 165

A problem thus arises in order to determine the reason for what has caused electoral reform to become such a political priority. According to Pippa Norris the last decade witnessed growing interest in 'electoral engineering'. In her review of the debates on reform which took place in Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the UK, she identifies three issues which played a role in triggering demands for electoral reform in all these countries. These are electoral change, such as the weakening of electoral alignments, political scandals and government failures which decrease public confidence in the system at hand at the time, and the ability of voters to use referenda in order to incur change within the government. Norris thus argues that these issues have given rise to a debate where electoral reform is seen as completing a process of democratization which would put an end to failures in the political system[286].

[286] Norris, Pippa. 2003. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour*, Cambridge University Press, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

pp. 110-111. Adoption of literature reference.

It is difficult to establish exactly what has caused electoral reform to become so high on the agenda of politics. In a review of the debates in Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and the UK, Pippa Norris (1995a: 7) discerns three long-term factors which these countries (or part, appear to have played a role in triggering demands for electoral reform: (1) electoral change (and, in particular, the weakening of electoral alignments); (2) 'political scandals and/or government failures which rock public confidence in the political system'; and (3) the ability of voters (in Italy and New Zealand) to use referendums to force the hands of politicians. Norris comments: 'Long-term conditions created the potential for change, and electoral reform is seen as completing a process of democratization which would put an end to deep-rooted failures in the political system.'

Farrell, 1997, p. 165

Reformers have sought to achieve either great government accountability through majoritarian arrangements or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional formulae. This section will examine the debates underlying the impact and consequences of electoral reform for political representation and voting behaviour.

p. 111. Norris's work was already published in 2003, as indicated in the bibliography of the dissertation (p. 128):

Norris, Pippa. 2003. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour*, Cambridge University Press, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Attempts at electoral engineering have commonly sought to achieve a balance between greater democratic accountability through majoritarian systems or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional systems. Underlying the long-standing normative debates are certain important empirical claims about the consequences of electoral engineering for voting choices and for political representation. Electoral reform is founded upon the principle that altering the formal

Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (New York 2004), online version available at: https://olemiss.edu/courses/pol628/norris04.pdf, p. 2

particular disadvantages of the system in use. For example, in countries where proportional representation is used, complaints are concerned less with the proportionality of the system, and more about government accountability and parliamentary representation. Dunleavy and Margetts, for instance, express concerns with the size of the electoral districts in list systems or the degree of party control over the candidate lists. They refer to Italy, Japan, Israel and the Netherlands[287]. Farrell however claims that the previous system of SNTV used in Japan could hardly be categorized as 'proportional'[288] and the reasons prompting the change in Italy and Japan concerned issues of political corruption rather than parliamentary accountability.

[287] Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts. January 1995. "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform". *International Political Science Review*. Issue 16. Page 13. See also Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 229.

[288] Shiratori, 1995

pp. 111-112. Farrell is mentioned late in the paragraph, in a way that suggests only the following content has been copied. Moreover, the footnotes do not refer to Farrell but are adopted literature references.

In PR countries, the push for electoral reform has had different root causes. Here, by definition, there is less concern about the proportionality of the system. According to Dunleavy and Margetts (1995), there is, instead, a concern about questions of accountability and parliamentary representation, relating either to the large electoral districts in PR list systems or to the degree of party control over the candidate lists. They refer to four cases: Italy, Japan, Israel and the Netherlands. While in general this is a credible argument, one can take issue with certain aspects of detail. For instance, the (now defunct) Japanese single non-transferable vote system could hardly be categorized as 'proportional' (Shiratori, 1995), and the catalyst for change in Italy and Japan had rather more to do with issues of political corruption generally than with the specifics of parliamentary accountability.

Farrell, 1997, p. 166

Exponents on electoral systems tend to disagree and break down into two main camps: those who suggest that the aim should be for 'simple' electoral systems, many of which seem to want to denigrate any of the alternative voting systems on offer because they are 'too complicated', as opposed to those who tend to favour more complex ones.

Included in the former camp are Sartori[292] who is favourable towards the French second ballot system, and Blais and Carty[293] who similarly argue for majoritarian systems. The argument in favour of such systems revolves around the importance of government stability.

[292] Sartori, Giovanni. 1986. "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?" In *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon.
[293] Blais A. and Carty R.K. 1987. "The Impact of Electoral Formulae on the Creation of Majority Governments". *Electoral Studies*. Issue 6. Pages: 209-18.

pp. 114-115. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

ists on electoral systems. They tend to break down into two main camps: those who suggest that the aim should be for 'simple' electoral systems, and those who tend to favour more complex electoral systems.

In the first camp, for instance, there is Giovanni Sartori (1995) who favours the (French) second ballot system. Blais and Massicotte (1996) also express a preference for majoritarian systems. In both cases the argument in favour of majoritarian systems revolves around the importance of government stability. There is also the idea that

Farrell, 1997, p. 166

and processes in new democracies. In this regard, Taagepera and Shugart express a preference for small, multi-member constituencies, with proportional representation formulae. They argue for simplicity as they state that "there should be no complexities such as adjustment seats, thresholds, multi-stage elections, or multi-tiered seat allocations"[295]. However, they seem to contradict themselves in the closing sentence of the book, when they cautiously indicate a preference for STV.

On the other hand, Lijphart, argues for systems which exercise multi-tier districting, legal thresholds, vote transfers and *apparentement*[296]. Indeed, although he agrees with Taagepera and Shugarts' arguments for simplicity in that the aim should be towards "incremental improvements", and not "revolutionary

[295] Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.* New Haven: Yale University Press. Page 236.

[296] Arend, Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press. Page 145.

democratizing country, Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 236) indicate a preference for small, multi-member constituencies, with some kind of proportional electoral formula. They also stress the need to keep it simple: there should be 'no complexities such as adjustment seats, thresholds, multi-stage elections, or multi-tiered seat allocations'. Ultimately, in the closing sentence of their book they express a guarded preference for STV.

In the second camp, Arend Lijphart shows no apparent concern about the complexity of certain electoral systems. In his advice to would-be electoral reformers, he stresses the virtues of such features as two-tier districting, national legal thresholds, vote transferability and *apparentement* (Lijphart, 1994: 145). While Lijphart does tend to agree with Taagepera and Shugart that in the case of existing electoral systems the preference should be for 'incremental improvements, not revolutionary upheaval' (ibid.: 151), his advice for 'electoral engi-

Farrell, 1997, pp. 166-167

p. 115. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

upheaval"[297], his advice for "electoral engineers in the new democracies" is to examine "all the options"[298].

[297] Arend, Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press. Page 151.

[298] Arend, Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*, Oxford University Press. Page 152.

p. 116. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

revolutionary upheaval' (ibid.: 151), his advice for 'electoral engineers in the new democracies' is to examine 'all the options' (ibid.: 152). Dunleavy and Margetts are even more explicit in making a

Farrell, 1997, p. 167

In making a straightforward case for complex electoral systems, Dunleavy and Margetts are clearer in their suggestions. They argue that the reforms that took place in the early 1990s in Italy, Japan and New Zealand, constitute a "convergence of liberal democracies" towards mixed electoral systems[299]. They argue this on the basis that hybrid systems combine the "accountability strengths of the plurality rule in single-member constituencies with the offsetting proportional qualities of regional or national lists"[300].

Even in this short review, we can see that there is little agreement between the experts. Opinions vary widely and all are based on sound arguments. Farrell concludes that if the specialists cannot agree on which is best, it is hardly

[299] Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts. January. 1995. "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform". *International Political Science Review*. Issue 16. Page 26.

[300] Dunleavy, Patrick and Helen Margetts. January. 1995. "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform". *International Political Science Review*. Issue 16. Page 27.

p. 116. Adoption of literature references and adjustment of the quote by Dunleavy and Margetts. Farrell is mentioned very late, without any footnote, in a way that suggests only the following contents have been copied.

152). Dunleavy and Margetts are even more explicit in making a virtue of electoral system complexity. They suggest that the reforms of the early 1990s (in Italy, Japan and New Zealand) reflect an 'apparent convergence of liberal democracies' (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1995: 26) towards what they call 'mixed' electoral systems (referred to in chapter 5 above as the two-vote system). Contrary to Sartori's (1994: 75) dismissal of the two-vote system as 'a bastard-producing hybrid', Dunleavy and Margetts (1995: 27) are inclined to see it in a much more positive light: 'It combines the accountability strengths of plurality rule in single-member constituencies with the offsetting proportional qualities of regional or national lists.'

Even in this short review, we can see that there is little agreement between the various specialists: Blais and Massicotte and Sartori

Farrell, 1997, p. 167

been repeatedly illustrated, candidate-based electoral systems which combine the elements of proportionality with preferential voting, provide greater facilities for voters to act strategically on polling-day. At the same time, they provide a check

p. 116

actions of voters on polling day. It is clear that candidate-based electoral systems, and particularly those which facilitate preferential voting, provide greater scope for voters to act strategically when voting; they also help to tie the politicians into a closer relationship

Farrell, 1997, p. 168

The normative case in favour of allowing voters such freedom in preferential voting systems is set forward most eloquently by Enid Lakeman, "Elections are for the benefit of the electors, not for the political parties or any other interests, and the electors must see to it that they get a system which seems to them adequate for the expression of their views"[301].

[301] Lakeman, E. 1974. *How Democracies Vote: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems*. 3rd Ed. London: Faber and Faber. Page 273.

pp. 116-117. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

be given several votes (as under SNTV). The normative case in favor of allowing voters such freedom is set forward most eloquently by Enid Lakeman (1974). STV allows voters to choose both between and within parties and so reflects a diversity of opinions within society.

Elections are for the benefit of the electors, not for the political parties or any other interests, and the electors must see to it that they get a system which seems to them adequate for the expression of their views. (Lakeman 1974, 273)

Bowler, Grofman, 2000 (Introduction), p. 6

Indeed, despite the various misgivings expressed by a number of authors, STV remains much written about in the academic literature as a system with positive features. In fact, it has many proponents such as Bogdanor[303], Farrell[304], Newman[305], and Wright[306].

[305] Bogdanor, Vernon. 1984. *What is Proportional Representation? A Guide to the Issues*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
[304] Farrell, David. 2000. "The United Kingdom Comes of Age? The British Electoral Reform 'Revolution' of the 1990s." In *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Accounting for the Causes and Consequences of a Worldwide Trend in Electoral Reform*, edited by Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, Mathew S. Shugart, and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[305] Newman, Terry. 1992. *Hare-Clark in Tasmania: Representation of All Opinions*. Hobart, Tasmania: Joint Library Committee of the Parliament of Tasmania.
[306] Wright, J.F.H. 1980. *Mirror of the Nation's Mind: Australia's Electoral Experiments*. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger.

p. 117. Adoption of literature references without citing the original source.

Although it has not been adopted by any of these states, STV has still featured prominently in debates about electoral reform. It remains much written about in the academic literature as a system with positive features and has many proponents (Bogdanor 1984; Farrell 1998; Lakeman 1970; Newman 1992; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Wright 1980). Among the positive fea-

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, p. 17

However, seeing that only two small countries – Ireland and Malta – have adopted STV for their national lower-house elections, STV suffers from what Bowler and Grofman term, a "credibility problem"[307].

[307] Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. *STV's Place in the Family of Electoral Systems*. United States of America: University of Michigan Press.

p. 118. The quote is wrongly attributed to the authors of the compilation, Bowler and Grofman.

of STV is that, to date, only two small countries—Ireland and Malta—have adopted it for their national lower-house elections. Questions are raised about STV suffers from a credibility problem. It may be the case that people

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, p. 18

In 1975, Christopher Aachen stated his opinion in a much quoted article that appeared in the *American Political Science* Review. Although a considerable amount of time has passed, during which major developments have taken place, his arguments are still very much valid today. Thus he explains, "The most important reason halting the spread of STV has been the emergence of modern, mass political parties. When STV was being promoted almost a century ago, parties were comparatively new, and responsible parliamentary government had not yet become responsible party government…"[308] A similar line of

[308] Aachen, Christopher. 1975. "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response." *American Political Science Review*. Issue 69. Page 1227.

p. 118. The relevant text is NOT to be found in Achen's article.

widely adopted. The most important reason halting the spread of STV has been the emergence of modern, mass political parties. When STV was being promoted almost a century ago, parties were comparatively new, and responsible parliamentary government had not yet become responsible party government. With the continuing concentration of legislative power in the hands of

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, p. 33

argumentation can be found in Laver and Marsh's article, "Parties and Voters"[309] whereby they show how, with the continuing concentration of legislative power in the hands of the parties, political parties have sought after electoral systems that preserve rather than diminish their power over the body of voters.

This lack of interest in introducing STV thus suggests that it will continue to be used in a small number of countries where it has become a permanent feature of the political landscape. Moreover, the steps that have been taken by the established democracies such as Italy to replace its PR system due to a multitude of disadvantages do not provide a good example for countries that might otherwise seriously consider its introduction. Therefore, according to Bowler and Grofman[310], STV will undoubtedly remain in the countries where it is well-established, although even here, it is likely to be placed under increasing pressure by party organisations keen to further increase their political power. Whether this

[309] Laver, Michael and Michael Marsh. 1999. "Parties and Voters". In *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, 3rd Ed. London: Faber and Faber.
[310] Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman. 2000. *STV's Place in the Family of Electoral Systems*. United States of America: University of Michigan Press.

pp. 118-119. In the first paragraph, the author is referring to Laver and Marsh, however, in Farrell and McAllister there is no mention of this article. In the second paragraph, statements are wrongly attributed to the authors of the compilation, Bowler and Grofman.

ment. With the continuing concentration of legislative power in the hands of parties, particularly in the postwar years, political parties have naturally sought electoral systems that preserve rather than diminish their power over the electorate.

What future exists for the various forms of STV? The lack of interest in introducing STV, particularly in the new democracies, suggests that it will remain the preserve of a small number of countries where it has become a permanent feature of the political landscape. Moreover, the steps that have been taken by the established democracies such as Italy to replace PR because of its alleged deficiencies do not provide a good example for countries that might otherwise seriously consider its introduction. STV will undoubtedly remain in the countries where it is well entrenched, but even here, it is likely to be placed under increasing pressure by party organizations keen to further concentrate their political power.

Farrell, McAllister, 2000, pp. 33-34

In fact, a notable aspect of Maltese electoral politics has been the coexistence of STV, an electoral formula whose distinguishing emphasis is on separate individual candidacies, with the pre-eminence of political parties from the very beginning. Over the years, the Constitution, laws, and regulations have increasingly acknowledged and promoted the role of political parties as central actors in the electoral process[313]. Thus the constitution requires that the party affiliation of candidates be indicated on the ballot paper, and since 1987 it has required that the aggregate number of first-preference votes for political party candidates, may determine how many seats a party will have in Parliament. Moreover, a look at the record of election outcomes would demonstrate that STV has worked well in ensuring relatively frequent change in the government.

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[313] Hirczy de Miño, Wolfgang and John C. Lane. 1996. "STV in Malta: Some Surprises." *Representation* Issue 34 (1). Pages 21-28.

pp. 119-120. The footnote refers to Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, but since the text is almost a word-for-word copy, it would have been necessary to cite in quotation marks. Moreover, the copying continues after the footnote without any further reference.

A notable aspect of Maltese electoral politics has been the coexistence of STV, an electoral formula whose distinguishing emphasis is on separate individual candidacies, with the pre-eminence of political parties from the very beginning. Over the years the constitution, laws, and regulations have increasingly acknowledged and promoted the role of political parties as central actors in the electoral process. Thus, the constitution requires that the party affiliation of candidates be indicated on the ballot paper, and since 1987 it has required that the aggregate number of first-preference votes for political party candidates, and not simply the success of individual candidates, may determine how many seats a party will have in Parliament. These provisions and a

Malta's electoral system has worked reasonably well in ensuring change in government as demonstrated by the record of election outcomes (see fig. 6).

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, pp. 179, 194

necessarily true for other states. Indeed, in light of the effects of different electoral formulas on composition of Parliament in terms of parties and on government formation and stability[314], one might say that Malta's two-party system, and single-party government, have persisted despite PR simply because the public prefers it that way. It is not because STV is the electoral system in use.

[314] Blais, André, and R. K. Carty. 1987. "The Impact of Electoral Formulae on the Creation of Majority Governments." *Electoral Studies*. Issue 6. Pages 209-18.

p. 120. Adoption of literature reference without citing the original source.

In light of the conventional wisdom regarding the effects of different electoral formulas on composition of Parliament in terms of parties and on government formation and stability (Blais and Carty 1987), one might say that Malta's two-party system, and single-party government, have persisted despite PR simply because the public prefers it that way. This may, of course,

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 179

This may, of course, change in the future. At present, there are no interest groups promoting electoral reform and there are no institutional instruments to circumvent one-party majorities in the legislature. Malta used to have a multiparty system and may yet have one once again[315]. Reform might then start to be considered in the

p. 120. The footnote does not refer to Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000.

despite PR simply because the public prefers it that way. This may, of course, change in the future. Malta used to have a multiparty system and may yet have one again.

7. At present there are no interest groups promoting electoral reform and there are no institutional mechanisms, such as citizen initiatives, to bypass the one-party majorities in the legislature.

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, pp. 179, 204

arrangements. Many of the values that electoral systems are expected to generate, need to be reconciled with the political and social context in which they are embedded and with the feasibility constraints that are present as a result of such

p. 121

ises. Moreover, many of the values that electoral systems are expected to further will not only compete with each other but are also in direct opposition to each other. A further caveat concerns the implications of such assessments. Any prescriptions flowing from them have to be reconciled with the political reality of feasibility constraints. Many proposed electoral reforms are entirely

Hirczy de Miño, Lane, 2000, p. 193

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